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ARTICLES
THE AGENCY COSTS OF AGENCY CAPITALISM:
ACTIVIST INVESTORS AND THE REVALUATION OF
GOVERNANCE RIGHTS
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon
Equity ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share ownership of the canonical Berle-Means firm. Instead, we
observe the reconcentration of ownership in the hands of institutional
investment intermediaries, which gives rise to “the agency costs of agency
capitalism.” This ownership change has occurred because of (i) political
decisions to privatize the provision of retirement savings and to require
funding of such provision and (ii) capital market developments that
favor investment intermediaries offering low-cost diversified investment
vehicles. A new set of agency costs arises because in addition to
divergence between the interests of record owners and the firm’s
managers, divergence exists between the interests of record owners—the
institutional investors—and the beneficial owners of those institutional
stakes. The business model of key investment intermediaries like mutual
funds, which focus on increasing assets under management through
superior relative performance, undermines their incentive and competence to engage in active monitoring of portfolio company performance.
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Such investors will be “rationally reticent”—willing to respond to
governance proposals but not to propose them.
We posit that shareholder activists should be seen as playing a
specialized capital market role of setting up intervention proposals for
resolution by institutional investors. The effect is to potentiate institutional investor voice, to increase the value of the vote, and thereby to
reduce the agency costs we have identified. We therefore argue against
recent proposed regulatory changes that would undercut shareholder
activists’ economic incentives by making it harder to assemble a
meaningful toehold position in a potential target.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 864
I. THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION: FROM CAPITAL MARKETS TO
GOVERNANCE ....................................................................................... 869
II. THE RECONCENTRATION OF RECORD OWNERSHIP AND THE RISE OF
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A. Retirement Savings and the Rise of Institutional Ownership .... 878
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D. The Puzzle of What to Do with Institutional Investors .............. 888
III. WHY INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP WILL UNDERVALUE THE VOTE
AND CREATE NEW AGENCY COSTS ........................................................ 889
IV. ACTIVISTS AS GOVERNANCE ARBITRAGEURS ......................................... 896
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REGULATORY REGIME ................................ 902
A. Proposal of Reducing the Ownership Threshold and
Shortening the Disclosure Window ........................................... 906
B. Proposal of Including Economic Exposure Through
Derivatives ................................................................................... 912
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 916
INTRODUCTION
The canonical account of U.S. corporate governance, which stresses
the tension between dispersed shareholders and company managers in
large public firms, has become factually obsolete and now provides a
misleading framework for contemporary corporate governance theorizing. 1 In this account, framed eighty years ago by Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means, shareholders individually own too few shares to monitor
1. See, e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United
States, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1377, 1384, 1388 (2009) (noting, for S&P 500 firms, 89% have
blockholders, and for all U.S. public firms, blockholder ownership averages 39%); see also
Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth? 83 Bus. Hist. Rev. 443,
467 (2009) (noting U.S. ownership patterns are not monolithic, though ownership
separation is useful reference point).
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management’s performance and confront coordination costs that make
collective monitoring difficult. 2 But as we shall see, the Berle-Means
premise of dispersed share ownership is now wrong. In 2011, for
example, institutional investors owned over 70% of the outstanding stock
of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.3
In this Article, we address the impact on corporate governance of
the ownership reconcentration of U.S. public corporations. Beneficial
owners now typically hold their equity interests through a set of intermediary institutions like pension funds and mutual funds, which are the
actual record owners and hold equity as fiduciaries for their beneficiaries. This shift from the Berle-Means archetype of widely distributed
ownership to concentrated institutional ownership gives rise to what we
call “agency capitalism,” an ownership structure in which agents hold
shares for beneficial owners. The consequence is a double set of agency
relationships: between shareholders and managers and between beneficial owners and record holders.
The familiar Berle-Means agency problem arises because of the
divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders.4 In an
agency capitalism world, there is added a new agency problem that
results from the gap between the interests of institutional record owners
and beneficial owners. As developed below, a significant percentage of
these institutional fiduciaries have business models that limit their incentives and capacity to monitor the business choices of their portfolio
companies except through assessing stock market performance.5 The
combination of limited institutional investor incentives and limited
capacity establishes strong reasons to sell the stock of underperformers
rather than to undertake a governance intervention.6 Record owners
prefer exit to the exercise of governance rights even when a governance
approach is more valuable to the beneficial owners. This devaluing of
governance rights means that the reconcentrated (record) owners will
have limited interest in or capacity to reduce the Berle-Means agency
problem.

2. See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 47–65 (rev. ed. 1967).
3. See Investor Responsibility Research Ctr. Inst. & Institutional S’holder Servs.,
Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Ten Year Performance and Risk
Review 9–10 (2012), available at http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-Controlled-CompanyISS-Report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing empirical evidence of
significant blockholdings in U.S. public corporations); Holderness, supra note 1, at 1379–
85 (same).
4. See Berle & Means, supra note 2, at 112–16 (explaining “divergence of interest
between ownership and control”).
5. See infra Part III (discussing limitations of institutional ownership and agency
costs).
6. See infra notes 96–105 and accompanying text (discussing reasons institutional
investors are reluctant to undertake governance intervention).
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Some jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom,7 the European
Union,8 and Israel,9 have sought to bridge this gap by advocating a new
set of governance obligations—those of “stewardship” or “sustainable
engagement”—for institutional owners generally. From this perspective,
the task is to “fix” the existing governance model to improve the operation of the capital markets. We present a very different view. We argue
that the disinterest of these institutions in serving as active monitors of
portfolio companies is an endogenous response to the particular agency
relationships that arise from reconcentrated record ownership in investment intermediaries.10 In turn, the appearance of activist shareholders,
7. See Fin. Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code 6 (2012), available at
http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-Stew
ardship-Code-September-2012.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasizing
“institutional investor’s duty is to act in the interests of its . . . benficiaries” and describing
“[s]tewardship activities” as including “monitoring and engaging with companies on
matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance”);
John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making 44
(2012) [hereinafter Kay, The Kay Review], available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISC
ore/business-law/docs/K/12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (“All participants in the equity investment chain should
act according to the principles of stewardship, based on respect for those whose
funds are invested or managed, and trust in those by whom the funds are invested or
managed . . . .”).
8. See Commission Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework, at
11–12, COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_m
arket/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing “lack of shareholder engagement” and European Commission’s
options to facilitate engagement); Resolution on a Corporate Governance Framework for
European Companies, Eur. Parl. Res. (A7-0051/2012) ¶¶ 25, 34, 2012 O.J. (C 161)
(adopting text P7_TA(2012)0118) (emphasizing European Parliament “[w]elcomes the
development of Stewardship Codes for institutional investors across the European Union”
and “believes that a European Stewardship Code could be developed”). Based on the
consultation process around its Green Paper, the European Commission recently
published its 2012 “Action Plan” for European company law and corporate governance
that will include an “initiative . . . on the disclosure of voting and engagement policies as
well as voting records by institutional investors.” Action Plan: European Company Law and
Corporate Governance—A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and
Sustainable Companies, at 8, COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/121212_company-law-cor
porate-governance-action-plan_en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also id.
(“Effective, sustainable shareholder engagement is one of the cornerstones of listed
companies’ corporate governance model . . . .”).
9. See Principal Recommendations of the Committee on Enhancing Competitiveness
(Isr.), available at http://www.mof.gov.il/lists/list26/attachments/291/2011-1111.pdf
(translation on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 23, 2013)
(recommending, among other things, encouragement of institutional investors to play
activist role). For an analysis finding similar behavior and similar problems by institutions
worldwide, see generally OECD, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good
Corporate Governance (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovern
anceprinciples/49081553.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
10. See infra Part III (discussing limitations of institutional ownership and agency
costs).
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such as hedge funds, who acquire a significant but noncontrolling stake
in a corporation and then try to alter the company’s business strategy
initially through persuasion but sometimes through a follow-on proxy
contest, should be seen as an endogenous response to the monitoring
shortfall that follows from ownership reconcentration in intermediary
institutions.11
In this analysis, the activist shareholders are governance intermediaries: They function to monitor company performance and then to
present to companies and institutional shareholders concrete proposals
for business strategy through mechanisms less drastic than takeovers.
These activists gain their power not because of their equity stakes, which
are not controlling, but because of their capacity to present convincing
plans to institutional shareholders, who ultimately will decide whether
the activists’ proposed plan should be followed. As this Article develops,
institutional shareholders are not “rationally apathetic” as were the dispersed owners on whose behalf the institutions now hold shares, but
instead are “rationally reticent”: Intermediary institutional holders will
respond to proposals but are unlikely themselves to create them. The
role for activist shareholders is to potentiate institutional voice; specialists
in monitoring combine through the capital markets with specialists in
low-cost diversification to provide a form of market-based stewardship.
The governance problem that arises from the “separation of ownership from control” is the undervaluation of the vote as a mechanism to
impose change. The reconcentration of ownership through institutions
adds only marginally to the value of the vote, much less than otherwise
would be expected, because of the agency problems of agency capitalism.
The role of a new entrant into the governance story, the activist shareholder, is to increase the value of the vote held by the institutions by
teeing up the intervention choices at low cost to the institutional owners.
If the intervention is successful, the activist’s equity position will increase
in value, as will that of the institutions. The expectation of that increase
gives the activist the incentive to proceed, which in turn mitigates a
problem of agency capitalism.
As we will show, the move to reconcentrated ownership in investment intermediaries is a consequence of two factors: first, the political
decisions to privatize retirement provisioning (beyond the social safety
net of Social Security) and to facilitate advance funding; and second, the
intellectual triumph of modern portfolio theory, which promotes
diversification as the touchstone investment strategy.12 The result is a
fundamental shift, from a Berle-Means capital market characterized by
passive dispersed shareholders to one of agency capitalism characterized
by concentrated but reticent intermediaries. This shift illustrates both the
11. See infra Part IV (discussing role of activists as governance arbitrageurs and
solution to agency costs of agency capitalism).
12. See infra Part II (discussing these two factors).
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fact that corporate governance is bound up with the way capital markets
support the transfer of risk to investors, and the direction of causation.
Changes in the available mechanisms of risk transfer drive ownership
changes; corporate governance institutions then adapt to ensure an
allocation of governance rights that facilitates the available risk transfer
techniques. Thus, innovation in the capital markets determines the efficient structure of corporate governance: The manner in which risk is
transferred and the corresponding governance structure that supports
that transfer depend on the evolution of the capital markets.
Contemporary objections to the role of activist investors largely
ignore how activist investors are the product of the changes in U.S.
equity ownership, and that they operate to revalue governance rights,
whose value depreciated as they came to be held by institutions in whose
business model governance rights were at best peripheral. 13 Stated
simply, the availability of low-cost diversification under the aegis of
institutional investors, combined with the corresponding institutional
investor business model, creates the agency costs of agency capitalism. A
corporate governance structure that was suited to a Berle-Means ownership distribution must evolve in response to the change in ownership
distribution.
Regulatory regimes must also adjust. The current debate over new
regulatory interventions that can affect the incentives of potential
governance activists highlights the need for complementarity between
ownership patterns and governance and regulatory structures. As we will
argue, debates over the terms of the stock accumulation disclosure
triggered under the Williams Act14 so far have largely ignored the evolution of capital markets since 1967 and the resulting change in ownership
patterns, even though the SEC has ample discretion to take those new
patterns into account.
Reflecting the authors’ expertise, this Article focuses largely on the
evolution of U.S. ownership patterns and governance structures. However, our analysis should prove useful in assessing developments in other
countries. In particular, the efforts in jurisdictions as different as the
European Union, the United Kingdom, and Israel seek to harness institutional investors as “stewards,” that is, as active monitors of long-term
13. E.g., Adam O. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts
on the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of
Shareholder Power, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1–4), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138945 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing SEC
should modify section 13(d) reporting rules to limit activists’ ability to acquire substantial
stakes without disclosure to market); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The
Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39, 47–49 (2012)
(examining empirical evidence of value of activist blockholders).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006) (requiring any person acquiring more than 5% of
beneficial ownership of registered equity security to file report with SEC within ten days
after acquisition).
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company performance.15 These efforts, it will be apparent, ignore that
the structure of agency capitalism gives intermediary institutional
investors little incentive to play this role; as a result, the institutions
largely lack the competence to undertake it.
Part I illustrates the direction of causation between capital markets
innovation and corporate governance by rehearsing examples of how
changes in the capital markets give rise to responsive changes in governance. Part II then takes up the evolution of agency capitalism in response
to developments in the capital markets, stressing the impact of changes
in the financing of retirement security. Part III argues that a regime of
agency capitalism results in the general undervaluation of governance
rights, which sets up Part IV’s framing of a role for active investors as
governance intermediaries (or, more specifically, as governance rights
arbitrageurs). Finally, Part V considers the existing regulatory environment, including current reform proposals, in light of their effect on the
supply of activist shareholders, with particular emphasis on proposals in
the United States (and actions already taken in the United Kingdom and
E.U. member states) to eliminate most of the timing gap between an
activist investor’s acquisition of the disclosure-triggering percentage of a
company’s shares and its obligations to publicly disclose its
shareholdings. We conclude by reemphasizing the complementarities
between institutional investors and activists, in which the activists’ willingness to bet their assets, subject to ultimate judgment by the institutions,
revalues the institutions’ governance rights, and thus makes governance
markets more complete.
I. THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION:
FROM CAPITAL MARKETS TO GOVERNANCE
Changes in the capital markets drive the efficient structure of
corporate governance, not the other way around. Companies need risk
capital to take advantage of new opportunities and to capture economies
of scale and scope. Public investors who can diversify their shareholdings
are the cheapest risk bearers. Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen made
the point explicitly thirty years ago: “Common stock allows residual risk
to be spread across many residual claimants who individually choose the
extent to which they bear risk and who can diversify across organizations
offering such claims.”16 Since diversified shareholders do not bear unsystematic risk, they need not be paid to bear it.17 The result is a lower
15. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (discussing U.K., E.U., and Israeli
proposals).
16. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26
J.L. & Econ. 327, 329 (1983).
17. Standard portfolio theory decomposes risk into two categories: systematic risk
and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is that which all companies are exposed to—for
example, changes in gross domestic product (GDP) and interest rates. Systematic risk
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cost of capital. But this cheap risk bearing comes in tandem with the
expense of agency costs; someone else must manage the capital provided
by dispersed shareholders. The result is dual specialization—investors in
risk bearing and managers in managing—made possible by public capital
markets. Agency costs resulting from the divergence of interests between
professional managers and diversified shareholders are simply the
reciprocal of the benefits of specialization.18
The laser-like focus of corporate governance reformers on minimizing agency costs, starting at least with Jensen and Meckling’s classic 1976
article,19 is premised on the proposition that diversified shareholders are
the cheapest risk bearers, conditional on agency costs being effectively
addressed.20 Put differently, the ability to diversify gives rise both to a
demand for governance and, in turn, to its supply.21 Thus, when innovacannot be eliminated by diversification. Unsystematic risk is that which relates to a
particular company and can be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio. See Richard
A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 168–70
(10th ed. 2011).
18. See Berle & Means, supra note 2, at 112–16 (discussing “divergence of interest
between ownership and control”). The text somewhat reframes the point Berle and Means
were actually making. The separation of ownership and control, however efficient, in their
view resulted in corporations run by managers and accountable to no one. Id. The agency
problem served as a justification for New Deal efforts to empower regulators to hold
managers accountable for their actions.
19. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
20. Jensen and Meckling left open the possibility that changes in capital market
technology would alter the tradeoff between ownership concentration (lower agency
costs) and risk diversification. Id. at 319–23, 353–54.
21. This framing raises an example of the causation question given prominence by
the law and finance literature, which argues that governance protection of shareholders is
necessary for the emergence of diversified shareholders. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 15–16 (2000) (examining literature arguing
“investor protection encourages the development of financial markets”). We note that the
historical evidence supports the direction of causation described in the text: from capital
markets to governance, not from governance to capital markets. For the United Kingdom,
see Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and
Control: The British Experience, 46 Bus. Hist. 256, 275 (2004) (“The experience in the
UK correspondingly indicates that buoyant [capital] market conditions can provide a
hospitable milieu for transformative merger activity . . . .”); Julian Franks, Colin Mayer &
Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in
the United Kingdom, in A History of Corporate Governance Around the World: Family
Business Groups to Professional Managers 581, 593–97 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005)
(arguing “main cause” of decline in family ownership and rise of dispersed ownership was
equity issuance to outside shareholders, thereby diluting insider shareholdings). For
Germany, see Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, The Origins of the
German Corporation—Finance, Ownership and Control, 10 Rev. Fin. 537, 539 (2006)
(noting “existing measures of investor protection” do not explain “the high level of stock
market activity at the beginning of the 20th century” in Germany). For the United States,
see generally Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of
American Corporate Finance (1994) (arguing populist politics created demand for
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tion in the capital markets increases the range of instruments by which
risk can be transferred, governance techniques develop to support them.
Consider the following examples. The development of junk bonds in
the 1970s, initially used in the finance of noninvestment grade
companies, grew into a technique for financing hostile takeovers that
greatly expanded the potential targets of a hostile bid. Noninvestment
grade bond issuance rose in volume from less than 0.1% of total stock
market capitalization in 1977 to a high of 1.5% in 1986.22 By the mid- to
late 1980s, more than half of all junk bond issuances were related to
acquisitions.23 In 1988, for example, an amount equal to 1.25% of total
stock market capitalization was available to noninvestment grade issuers
to fund takeovers.24 In turn, the public issuance of subordinated debt
could support large amounts of mezzanine financing by bank consortia,
thereby substantially leveraging the resources of the junk bond market.
Nearly 23% of all major U.S. public companies were the object of a
hostile takeover during the period between 1982 and 1989, and 57% received a takeover bid of some kind.25 The next thirty years of corporate
governance debate over the allocation of governance responsibilities for
hostile takeovers was then driven by these capital market developments.26
The growth in the completeness of the debt market also gave rise to
a strong claim concerning a new form of governance. In 1989, Michael
Jensen argued that the leveraged buyout (LBO) association, in his view a
more efficient form of organizing capital and managing a business,
would come to supplant the Berle-Means corporation with its widely distributed shareholders and powerful managers who did not hold a significant equity stake in the organization.27
In 2008, Ronald Gilson and Charles Whitehead made a similar
connection between the completeness of the capital markets and
corporate governance. They argued that the development of risk

investor protection in United States); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed
Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control,
111 Yale L.J. 1, 80 (2001) (arguing based on U.S. experience that “the cause and effect
sequence posited by the LLS&V thesis may in effect read history backwards”).
22. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger
Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. Econ. Persp., Spring
2001, at 121, 126 fig.5.
23. Id. at 125.
24. Id. at 126 fig.5.
25. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on
Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. Fin. Econ. 193, 199 tbl.2 (1996).
26. See Ronald J. Gilson, Catalysing Corporate Governance: The Evolution of the
United States System in the 1980s and 1990s, 24 Company & Sec. L.J. 143, 150–51 (2006)
(arguing changes in U.S. capital markets, notably access to increased funds through junk
bond market, created “the market for corporate control” for “a wide range of major . . .
corporations”).
27. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.–Oct.
1989, at 61, 64–66.
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management—the transfer of risk in slices rather than through allpurpose risk bearing by common stockholders28—could substitute for
traditional common stock-based risk capital, with important implications
for the governance structure that supported risk transfer.29 The reduction in the centrality of common stock, which is a result of the higher
leverage that risk management allows, in turn facilitates the reemergence
of block positions and a change in control patterns.30
A final example of the link between capital market innovation and
governance structure concerns the relationship between stock market
informational efficiency and the role of independent directors. Jeffrey
Gordon has shown that the capital markets’ evolving informational efficiency facilitated the greatly expanded role of independent directors in
corporate governance.31 Independent directors provide a buffer between
corporate management and the capital markets, which allows courts to
rely on the directors’ assessments of how best to create value rather than
the courts having to make that assessment themselves.32 That stock prices
impound the public information about a corporation’s current and
future performance allows directors plausibly to discharge the function
courts assigns them.33 Again, the capital market’s evolving capacity drives
innovation in governance structures.
We offer these examples simply as evidence that corporate governance functions to support the transfer of risk to investors and is driven by
the instruments that financial innovation makes available through the
capital markets. Innovation in the capital markets determines the effi28. See Myron S. Scholes, Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment, 88 Am. Econ. Rev.
350, 366 (1998) (“Equity is a risk-management device. It is an ‘all-purpose’ risk cushion.”).
29. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 231, 263
(2008) (“Risk management at the firm level . . . may be more efficient than risk bearing by
diversified shareholders . . . .”). Identifying the particular scholarly contributions that
developed this analysis is merely illustrative and therefore somewhat arbitrary. Gilson and
Whitehead, for example, drew explicitly on Myron Scholes’ 1995 prediction that firms
would come to substitute less costly derivatives for equity capital. Myron S. Scholes, The
Future of Futures, in Risk Management: Problems and Solutions 349, 362–65 (William H.
Beaver & George Parker eds., 1995).
30 . Gilson and Whitehead argue that the development of risk management
techniques completed the capital market infrastructure necessary to support Jensen’s
argument that the LBO association could substitute for public ownership and could
explain the phenomenon of one private equity firm selling a portfolio company to
another private equity firm. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 251–53.
31. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1541–61
(2007) [hereinafter Gordon, Independent Directors].
32. See id. at 1523–26 (noting, with rise of independent directors in 1980s, Delaware
courts developed strategy to focus on independent directors’ “role in reviewing and
approving the defensive undertaking”).
33. See id. at 1541–61 (“As stock prices become more informative, the directors’
monitoring role increasingly consists of using stock price metrics to measure the firm’s
performance over time and against relevant intra-industry comparisons.”).
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cient structure of corporate governance; the manner in which risk is
transferred and the corresponding governance structure that supports
that transfer depend on capital market evolution. Frictions and
anomalies arise because the capital markets evolve at a faster rate than
governance structures adapt; path-dependent institutions move less
quickly than markets, in no small part because adaptation negatively
affects those favored by existing patterns.
A range of implications flows from the recognition that the efficient
structure of corporate governance is driven by capital market evolution,
whether as a result of financial innovation or of political economy.34
These include, for example, the risk that best practice codes—including
those of institutional investors like California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS) and guidelines by Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), which are necessarily based on where the
capital markets have been rather than where they are going—will result
in the petrification of the governance process.35 Similarly, that capital
market evolution drives corporate governance implies that ownership
structures may become more concentrated, with significant
blockholdings, even in countries with strong shareholder protection, as
the continued development of derivative markets permits risk transfer in
ways that move equity in the direction of an incentive contract most
efficiently held by managers.36
34. Thus, for our purposes, we need not address the right combination of financial
innovation that makes the capital markets more complete and thereby increases the set of
available risk transfer mechanisms, and the political forces that serve to limit them.
Importantly, the combination that shaped the path dependency in different countries
reflects the influence of local conditions. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate
Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q.
327, 329–39 (1996) (explaining link between corporate governance and path dependency,
and between governance institutions and industrial organization in United States, Japan,
and Germany); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of
Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329, 356–57 (2001) (surveying different
circumstances of corporate governance convergence and concluding “there can be no
general prediction of the mode that convergence of . . . institutions may take”).
35. Dani Rodrik makes the same point about the best practice codes of institutions,
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with respect to recommended
institutional structures to support economic growth in the developing world. Dani Rodrik,
Second-Best Institutions, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 100, 104 (2008). The OECD, which has
promulgated influential corporate governance standards, recognizes the impact of
changes in the capital markets on efficient corporate governance practices. As background
to an anticipated review of its standards, the OECD is undertaking an inventory of such
changes, including changes in ownership patterns. See Mats Isaksson & Serdar Celik,
Corporate Governance in Current Equity Markets: A Report to the OECD Project on
Corporate Governance, Value Creation and Growth 7–8 (Nov. 7, 2012) (unpublished
working paper) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing effort).
36. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 29, at 252. For example, if the firm can hedge
the systematic risk associated with a critical input—oil, for example—then managers can
bear more firm-specific risk, an arrangement that more closely ties their payoff to matters
under their control.
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We focus on an important current manifestation of this dynamic: the
reconceptualization of the value of governance rights and the role of
activist shareholders in the face of capital markets that have come to be
dominated by institutional investors acting as investment intermediaries.
The next Part takes up the reconcentration of shareholdings that gave
rise to agency capitalism and then to activist shareholders.
II. THE RECONCENTRATION OF RECORD OWNERSHIP
AND THE RISE OF AGENCY CAPITALISM
In recent years, the centrality of the Berle-Means description of the
distribution of U.S. stockholdings to the corporate governance debate
has been attacked from two opposite directions. From one direction,
critics who start from the Berle-Means account of U.S. equity holdings
have pointed out that the United States and the United Kingdom are
unique. Widely distributed equity holdings are neither typical of the rest
of the world nor even necessarily the direction in which capital market
evolution will lead. Everywhere else in the world, including both developed and developing countries, equity ownership of public corporations is characterized by controlling shareholders or blockholders.37
A more direct challenge comes from the opposite direction: The
Berle-Means description of the distribution of U.S. equity ownership
simply is no longer correct. In 1950, the Berle-Means description
advanced some twenty years earlier remained accurate. Equities were still
held predominately by households; institutional investors, including
pension funds, held only approximately 6.1% of U.S. equities.38 By 1980,
however, the distribution of shareholdings had begun to shift away from
households toward institutions. At that time, institutional investors held
28.4% of U.S. equities.39 By 2009, institutional investors held 50.6% of all
U.S. public equities, and 73% of the equity of the thousand largest U.S.
corporations.40 Table 1 sets out the institutional ownership of differentsize cohorts of U.S. public corporations in 2009.

37. See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1645–50 (2006)
(summarizing relevant literature); Holderness, supra note 1, at 1395 tbl.4 (providing more
recent data and comparing block ownership in U.S. and non-U.S. firms); Isaksson & Celik,
supra note 35, at 15 (showing share of global capitalization of stock markets in countries
with dispersed ownership has dropped by some 30% between 2000 and 2011).
38. Matteo Tonello & Stephan Rabimov, The Conference Bd., Inc., The 2010
Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition 22
tbl.10 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707512 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
39. Id.
40. Id. For a time series of institutional ownership between 1950 and 2004, see
Gordon, Independent Directors, supra note 31, at 1568 tbl.4 & fig.6. For similar
observations, see, e.g., Stuart L. Gillian & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder
Activism in the United States, 19 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 55, 57 fig.1 (2007).
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TABLE 1: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP OF LARGEST
U.S. CORPORATIONS IN 200941
Corporations Ranked by Size

Average Institutional Holdings

Top 50

63.7%

Top 100

66.9%

Top 250

69.3%

Top 500

72.8%

Top 750

73.9%

Top 1000

73.0%

Thus, for the largest U.S. corporations, institutions control the great
majority of outstanding shares. Put graphically but not metaphorically,
representatives of institutions that collectively represent effective control
of many large U.S. corporations could fit around a boardroom table. For
example, Table 2 sets out the percentage of the outstanding stock held in
2009 by the twenty-five largest institutions in the ten largest U.S. corporations in which there was not a controlling owner.
TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF OUTSTANDING STOCK IN TEN LARGEST U.S.
CORPORATIONS WITHOUT A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER HELD BY
TWENTY-FIVE LARGEST INSTITUTIONS IN 200942
Corporation
(in order of market value)

Percentage of Stock Held
by Twenty-Five Largest Institutions

Exxon Mobil Corp.

25.0%

Microsoft Corp.

31.9%

Apple Inc.

37.0%

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

17.2%

Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

19.2%

General Electric Co.

24.8%

Procter & Gamble Co.

29.1%

Bank of America Corp.

28.9%

Google Inc.

44.1%

JP Morgan Chase & Co.

35.8%

To be sure, the enormous growth in institutional holdings of U.S.
equities and the corresponding increase in ownership concentration are
41. Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 38, at 27 tbl.13.
42. Id. at 30–34.
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quite different from the control or blockholdings observed elsewhere in
the world. In their own way, U.S. institutions, like Berle-Means diversified
individual investors, are themselves passive with respect to much of
corporate governance despite the fact that they confront much lower
coordination and other collective action costs than individual investors
do. We will argue that the distribution of shareholdings in the United
States remains unique, no longer because of its great breadth, but
because of the particular structure of the concentrated institutional
ownership that has developed. Real blockholders are not insignificant in
the United States;43 however, the central change in equity distribution
has been for equity ownership to concentrate in intermediary institutions, like pension funds and mutual funds, that are the record holders
of equity on behalf of their beneficiaries, mutual fund shareholders, or
pension retirees.44
This Part explores the impact on corporate governance of the
changes in the capital markets that have led to a pattern of U.S. equity
holdings that we call “agency capitalism.” By this we mean that the
beneficial owners of U.S. equity confront two agency relationships:
between the portfolio company management and the institutional record
holder and then between the record holder and the beneficial owner.
This relationship is depicted in Figure 1. While academics and the courts
have explored the management-shareholder agency relationship in great
depth, the institutional agency relationship has received far less attention.45
43. See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 1, at 1378 (“Ninety-six percent of thesefirms
have shareholders who own at least 5% of thefirm’s common stock (‘blockholders’).
Three times as many firms have majority blockholders as have no blockholders.
Blockholders on average own 39% of a firm.”).
44. We distinguish this concentration from the nominal concentration that occurs
when record ownership is in “street name” or “nominee name,” even in the circumstances
in which brokers have commonly voted the shares held by beneficial owners. In the street
name setup, the retail owner can always claim voting rights,, and even before the recent
limits on broker voting, various notification systems mandated by the proxy rules
facilitated such voting pass-throughs. The retail investor could also assert control over the
disposition of portfolio securities. By contrast, in reconcentration through investment
intermediaries, the retail investor has, in effect, an undivided interest in the pool of
securities with no way of reclaiming any share of voting rights for any portfolio company.
Nor can a retail investor affect the composition of the portfolio.
45. A developing literature examines the extent to which recommendations by ISS
and other advisory services influence mutual fund voting. See, e.g., Jie Cai, Jacqueline L.
Garner & Ralph A. Walking, Electing Directors, 64 J. Fin. 2389, 2401 (2009) (noting
negative ISS recommendation unexplained by firm performance or governance
characteristics reduces director votes by 20.7% on average); Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch &
Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 Emory L.J. 869, 906
(2010) [hereinafter Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Proxy Advisors] (“[W]e find that the impact of
an ISS recommendation ranges from 6% to 13% for the median company.”); James
Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting
on Proxy Proposals, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 55 (2010) (“[M]utual funds voted in line with ISS
recommendations much more frequently than with contrary management
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We argue that changes in the capital markets, especially in the
manner in which retirement savings are channeled, have led to a significant change in ownership distribution and complementary changes in
corporate governance. In particular, the intermediary institutions’
business model and their corresponding expertise define and limit the
role they play in corporate governance. Part III develops how these limits
result in a general undervaluation by the market of governance rights.
Part IV in turn frames an important role for activist investors. As governance intermediaries or governance arbitrageurs, activist shareholders
can, in the right circumstances, serve to reduce the market’s undervaluation of governance rights to the advantage of all shareholders.

recommendations.”). All report measurable but limited influence. Assessing the influence
of proxy advisors is beyond the ambition of this Article. For further discussion, see Angela
Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Voting, 17 J. Corp.
Fin. 914, 927 (2011) (finding “funds tend to support proposals which are likely to
positively impact shareholder wealth” and “fund approval rates have a significant impact
on whether a proposal is ultimately passed by shareholders and whether management
implements that proposal”); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual
Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. Corp. L. 843, 846 (2009)
(“[T]he greater the dependency of [mutual funds] upon [corporate clients] for asset
management business, the less likely the fund family will be [able] to support shareholdersponsored governance resolutions.”); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Voting
Through Agents: How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections 12–18 (Univ. of Pa. Inst.
for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 11-28, 2011) [hereinafter Choi, Fisch & Kahan,
Voting Through Agents], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912772 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (considering various ways that mutual funds economize on voting
costs).
Other literature examines whether forcing institutional investors to reveal their
governance decisions, at least as expressed through voting, changes behavior. See, e.g.,
K.J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on
Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rule, 13
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 220, 265 (2011) (finding evidence that mutual funds’ proxy votes in
support of management did not decline after SEC implemented vote disclosure rule);
Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on
Corporate Governance, 1 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 157, 171 (2006) (providing empirical evidence
that mutual funds “voted in general accordance with the policies they laid out in [the]
proxy policy disclosures” required by SEC).
Prior discussions of the two-sided agency relationship similar to that in this Article
can be found in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance After the Crisis 247–48
(2012) (arguing deficiency in institutional monitoring “merely relocates [the] locus” of
principal-agent problem); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1317–28 (1991) (explaining
money managers show “limited interest in corporate governance issues . . . because the
expected gains from most such governance issues are small, deferred, and received by
investors, while the costs are potentially large, immediate, and borne by money
managers”); Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from
Control, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 877, 878–79 (2010) (noting financial intermediaries, like
mutual funds and pension funds, “introduce the same separation of ownership from
control” and themselves “function[] much like the Berle and Means corporation”).
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FIGURE 1: THE SHAPE OF AGENCY CAPITALISM
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A. Retirement Savings and the Rise of Institutional Ownership
Post-World War II policy decisions concerning how retirement
security would be provided were a major, if at the time unrecognized,
cause of the rise of the U.S. system of agency capitalism.46 Three were of
particular significance: the initial decision to rely primarily on privately
funded pensions rather than to expand Social Security, the enactment of
the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),47

46. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic
Order, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1519, 1538–52 (1997) [hereinafter Gordon, New Economic
Order] (examining developments in stock market and pension funds); Martin Gelter, The
Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy 3 (Fordham Law Legal Studies
Research, Paper No. 2079607, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079607 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[C]hanges in the pension system helped to
transform corporate governance into a system dominated by the shareholder interest and
to edge out the managerial model.”). Peter Drucker recognized in the mid-1970s the
increasing equity ownership by pension funds but greatly overestimated how active
pension funds would be in corporate governance. Peter F. Drucker, The Unseen
Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America 1 (1976) (noting in 1976
American workers owned “more than one-third of the equity capital of American
business”).
47. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
1001–1461 (2006)); see also John H. Langbein, David A. Pratt & Susan J. Stabile, Pension
and Employee Benefit Law 78–145 (5th ed. 2010) (surveying history and structure of
ERISA); Gordon, New Economic Order, supra note 46, at 1541–44 (discussing passage of
ERISA and defined benefit plans); Gelter, supra note 46, at 16–17 (same).
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and the later shift in employer-provided pension plans from defined
benefit to defined contribution plans.48
The immediate post-war period saw a hotly contested debate over
how to finance retirement security in the United States: Stated simply,
would retirement support come primarily through private pension funds,
or through an expansion of the government Social Security program?49
Retirement assets that went into private pension funds could then be
invested in the capital markets, including equities, as compared to taxes
paid into the Social Security Trust Fund that have been invested in U.S.
Treasury securities. Reliance on private pension plans carried the day;
substantial tax incentives encouraged workers and employers to look to
such plans as the major source of their retirement savings despite some
increase in Social Security benefit levels.
The 1974 passage of ERISA augmented the impact on equity ownership of the private provision of retirement security, which resulted in a
further increase in funds available to the capital markets. Responding to
abuses in the management and funding of private pension funds,
Congress enacted legislation that requires companies to set up special
entities to hold pension resources that are governed by trustees having
fiduciary duties solely to their beneficiaries. Most importantly, ERISA
requires that the defined benefit plans currently fund the actuarially
determined annual payments necessary to pay future retirement obligations and pay down any prior unfunded past service costs over no more
than thirty years.50 This requirement resulted from the discovery that
many corporations had allowed a substantial build-up of unfunded past
service costs.51 Pension funds covering public employees, although not
covered by ERISA, followed suit. The result was an enormous concentra48. The rise of institutional owners is also intertwined with the modern understandings of the value of portfolio diversification. See infra Part II.B (discussing triumph
of modern portfolio theory).
49. See, e.g., William Graebner, A History of Retirement 215–41 (1980) (tracing
legislative, economic, and social factors that encouraged development of private pension
funds from World War II through 1950s); Alicia H. Munnell, Employer-Sponsored Plans:
The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution, in The Oxford Handbook of
Pensions and Retirement Income 359, 362–63 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Oxford Handbook] (“[A]fter the Second World War business and labor had
to re-create . . . the [employer-sponsored] pension system.”); Steven Sass, The
Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the Nineteenth Century to
1980, in Oxford Handbook, supra, at 76, 78, 83 (“The alternative postwar approach to the
old-age income problem, adopted by Anglo-Saxon nations such as the United States . . .
relied on an expansion of employer plans.”).
50 . See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) (2006) (setting forth minimum vesting
requirements for defined benefit plans); Employee Retirement Income and Security Act
of 1974 § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006) (same); id. §§ 301–308 (providing for minimum
funding standards); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 Yale
L.J. 451, 475–78 (2004) (summarizing impact of ERISA on defined benefit plans).
51. See Eric D. Chason, Outlawing Pension-Funding Shortfalls, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 519,
536–43 (2007) (reviewing ERISA funding requirements).
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tion of funds that would be invested in the capital markets. From 1980 to
1990, pension fund assets increased from $871 billion to $3.02 trillion.52
The impact of this increase on retirement fund assets appears clearly
through comparison with, for example, the typical unfunded German
pension funds, whose commitment to make retirement payments is
simply a promise not backed by dedicated assets.53 In effect, an unfunded
pension fund is fully invested in the company’s unsecured debt. 54
Although plainly unintentional, the U.S. requirement—that a pension
promise must be supported by assets held in trust rather than by a book
entry on a corporate balance sheet—both generated and concentrated
very large amounts of funds that would be invested in the capital markets
by a class of fiduciaries on behalf of future retirees.55
The shift away from defined benefit retirement plans to defined
contribution plans also expanded the role of intermediaries at the center
52. Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 38, at 25 tbl.12.
53. See, e.g., Bert Rürup, The German Pension System: Status Quo and Reform
Options, in Social Security Pension Reform in Europe 137, 138–43 (Martin Feldstein &
Horst Siebert eds., 2002) (describing German pension funding).
54. The European Union is currently considering a proposal that would require
balance sheet disclosure of unfunded liabilities of employer liabilities under defined
benefit pension plans. See Paul J. Davies, Fears Grow of £600bn Company Pension Bill,
Fin. Times (London), Jan. 2, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d9fc7b0-3302-11e1a51e-00144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“UK companies will have
to pump as much as £600bn ($930bn) into their corporate pension schemes under a
revamp of pensions regulation being considered in Europe . . . .”); see also European Ins.
& Occupational Pensions Auth., Response to Call for Advice on the Review of Directive
2003/41/EC: Second Consultation 74–85 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at https://
eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx_dam/files/consultations/consultationpapers/CP06-11/Cf
A-1-23-draft_advice_for_consultation_EIOPA-CP-11-006_.doc (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (considering “holistic balance sheet” approach “to record and measure on a
consistent basis the obligations and resources” of pension funds).
U.S. accounting rules have required such balance sheet disclosure since 1985,
another factor that burdened the use of defined benefit plans. See Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87: Employers’
Accounting for Pensions para. 35, at 15 (1985), available at http://www.amac.org.mx/pag
s/pdf/fas87.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (requiring “unfunded accrued
pension cost” to be recognized as liability “if net periodic pension cost recognized
pursuant to this Statement exceeds amounts the employer has contributed to the plan”);
see also Robert M. Harper, Jr. & Jerry R. Strawser, The Effect of SFAS 87 on Corporate
Funding of Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 20 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 815, 815–16 (1993)
(discussing requirements under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87).
55. This concentration of votes had an important role in hostile takeover fights. The
fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees under ERISA require trustees to vote on the
shares of the employer held by the plan solely in the interests of the beneficiaries, which
do not include the interests of future employees in the target company. The result is to
force the trustees, typically appointed by the target employer, to consider only the price
offered in making a decision whether to tender. See Armin G. Brecher, Simon Lazarus III
& William A. Gray, The Function of Employee Retirement Plans as an Impediment to
Takeovers, 38 Bus. Law. 503 (1983) (surveying voting obligations of plan trustees in
takeovers); Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not
Always Better, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 61, 93–97 (1998) (same).
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of an agency capitalism regime. Again, the motivation for the switch was
past service costs. The annual amount that an employer has to deposit in
a defined benefit plan depends importantly on the investment return the
fund can be expected to earn. A higher-assumed return results in smaller
current payments. A defined benefit plan commits the company to
providing employees with a specified retirement payment, typically a
percentage of their salary measured over a specified period, multiplied
by the employee’s years of employment with the plan sponsor.56 This
arrangement places all of the investment risk on the company; if overly
optimistic predicted investment returns prove too high, so that the fund
has too few assets to make expected retirement payments, the company,
if solvent, must make up the shortfall. Consistent with that allocation of
risk, the trustees of the pension funds, who are appointed by the
company, control the fund’s investment decisions.
A defined contribution plan, on the other hand, shifts the investment risk from the retirement fund sponsor to the employee. This prevents the employer from getting in trouble as a result of the unfortunate
alignment of incentives that favor optimistic predictions of investment
returns and a lower current payment to the pension fund (and therefore
increased reported earnings). Under a defined contribution plan, the
sponsor makes a specified annual contribution to the employee’s
account, which the employee then decides how to invest. The savings
available on the employee’s retirement then depend entirely on the
success of the employee’s investment decisions, with the result that
employers (and their balance sheets) do not bear the liability for future
investment performance. 57 Most commonly, the employee is given a
choice of investment options determined by the pension plan. Increasingly, these choices are largely mutual funds, reflecting the employees’
need for investment management advice.58
56. See, e.g., Gordon, New Economic Order, supra note 46, at 1541–42 (explaining
operation of defined benefit plan); Zelinsky, supra note 50, at 455–56 (same).
57. Edward Zelinsky describes how the shift from a defined benefit to a defined
contribution plan transfers to the employee the risks that investments will earn too little to
support retirement, that contributions to the plan actually will be made, and that the
employee will outlive his income. Zelinsky, supra note 50, at 458–68.
It was an odd policy choice to shift the investment risk from the employer, who
presumably was a more sophisticated investor (or had access to sophisticated investment
advice) and could secure economies of scale in managing that risk, to employees who
could be expected neither to be sophisticated themselves nor to have access to the same
quality of advice as would the employer. This shift has also been lamented on
distributional grounds. See Gordon, New Economic Order, supra note 46, at 1546.
Defined benefit plan payouts were geared to an employee’s final wage, which would be
increasing with the firm’s success and the employee’s experience. Defined contribution
plan payouts are less sensitive to final wages and are reduced by employees’ investment
conservatism.
58. Various factors push employers to move from a defined benefit to a defined
contribution plan. See Zelinsky, supra note 50, at 475 (summarizing these factors); see
also Gelter, supra note 46, at 16–20 (explaining reasons for this shift).
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The result has been a significant shift from defined benefit pension
plans to defined contribution pension plans. In 1990, defined contribution plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) totaled $1.5
trillion, and private defined benefit plans approximately $1.6 trillion.
Almost all of the subsequent growth in retirement assets took place in
defined contribution plans and IRAs ($9.2 trillion in total by 2010),
rather than in private defined benefit plans ($2.2 trillion by 2010).59
Figure 2 shows the change in the number of defined benefit and defined
contribution plans (as opposed to assets held) over the period from 1975
through 2007. Figure 3 shows the change in the number of participants
in each kind of plan. While the number of defined benefit plan participants has remained flat, the number of defined contribution plan participants has steadily risen over the same period.
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF PRIVATE-SECTOR QUALIFIED DEFINED BENEFIT
AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, 1975–200760
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59. Inv. Co. Inst., 2011 Investment Company Fact Book 101 fig.7.2, 102 (2011),
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2011_factbook.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 38, at 25 tbl.12; Gelter, supra note 46, at 13 fig.3.
This shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans is also gaining
strength in the United Kingdom. See Norma Cohen, Final-Salary Pensions Being Closed
Rapidly, Fin. Times (London), Dec. 15, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a35042ae2667-11e1-85fb-00144feabdc0.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
60. Emp. Benefit Research Inst., EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits ch. 10
tbls.10.2a & 10.2b (2011), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/data
book/DB.Chapter%2010.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF PRIVATE-SECTOR QUALIFIED DEFINED BENEFIT AND
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARTICIPANTS, 1975–200761
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For our purposes, this increase and concentration of financial power
had two important consequences. First, it created a source of funds that
could be deployed to fund large investments and still allow investors to
retain a diversified portfolio.62 For example, mutual funds in 2011 held
approximately 49.8% ($4.68 trillion) of defined contribution plans and

61. Id.
62. This growth was facilitated by a final regulation issued in 1979 by the Department
of Labor, the government agency charged with overseeing pension fund investments,
which stated that the suitability of a particular investment would be judged not in
isolation, but as a part of the pension fund’s entire portfolio. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b)(2)
(2012) (requiring fiduciary of employee benefit plan to give “appropriate consideration”
to “[t]he composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification” in discharging
fiduciary duties). The official commentary accompanying the regulation effectively
endorsed the portfolio approach:
The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of a
specific investment or investment course of action does not render such
investment or investment course of action either per se prudent or per se
imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be
judged without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment
course of action plays within the overall plan portfolio.
Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility; Investment of Plan Assets Under the
“Prudence” Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,222 (June 26, 1979).
Since prudence would be determined at the portfolio level, pension funds could
make individually risky investments, like limited partnership interests in private equity
funds involved in leveraged takeovers. For general background on the new investment
standard, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent
Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52 (1987).
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IRA assets,63 of which approximately 40.8% ($1.91 trillion) were invested
in U.S. equities.64 Second, decisionmaking over these concentrated funds
was centralized in a small number of individuals and institutions that
were obligated to consider only the best interests of the future retirees.
Again, to use mutual funds as an example, the five largest U.S. mutual
fund groups in 2005 controlled approximately 37% of total assets
invested in mutual funds, the largest ten controlled approximately 48%,
and the largest twenty-five controlled approximately 71%.65
B. The Triumph of Portfolio Theory
The past thirty-five years have seen a sharp increase in U.S.
household ownership of equities, but equity mutual funds have been the
vehicle. As of 1977, approximately 20% of households owned equities
directly. While the percentage of direct owners has remained stable, the
rise in mutual fund investment has increased the percentage of
households that own equities directly or through mutual funds by 30% to
a total of 50%.66 The increase in household mutual fund ownership has
been significantly advanced by the portfolio theory of diversified
investing. To be sure, a large fraction of mutual fund owners have come
to this form of investment through employer-sponsored defined
contribution accounts (in 2011, 32% of all households owned funds only
through an employer-sponsored retirement plan), but a significant
fraction owned mutual funds even without that connection (31% of
mutual fund holders, or 13% of all households, owned funds only
outside an employer-sponsored mutual fund plan). 67 Moreover, a
63. Inv. Co. Inst., 2012 Investment Company Fact Book 110 fig.7.5, 117 fig.7.12, 125
fig.7.21 (2012) [hereinafter ICI, 2012 Fact Book], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/20
12_factbook.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
64. Id. at 125 fig.7.21.
65. Inv. Co. Inst., Research Commentary: Competition in the Mutual Fund Business 2
fig.2 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rc_competition.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
66. Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Reconcentration in the United States, 5 Eur. Mgmt. Rev. 11, 15–16 (2008) (covering 1977–
2004 period). Current evidence from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer
Finances is consistent with this trend. As of the 2010 Survey, approximately 15% of all
families directly held stock; 9% directly held “pooled investment vehicles”; and 6% directly
held “other managed assets.” Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from
2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 Fed. Res. Bull., June
2012, at 1, 28 tbl.6, 34–35, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/
2012/pdf/scf12.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Yet the percentage of families
with direct or indirect ownership of stock were approximately 50%, with indirect
ownership primarily through tax-deferred retirement accounts, which heavily use mutual
funds. Id. at 41. Of the total number of household equity holdings, only 32% were through
direct stock ownership. The remainder took various collectively managed forms: 20%
directly through pooled investment vehicles, 6% through other managed vehicles, and
42% in tax-deferred retirement accounts. Id. at 42.
67. ICI, 2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 91.
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significant number of mutual fund holders (37%) hold mutual funds
both inside an employer account and outside.68
What led to this investment pattern? For greater equity investment,
one important factor was the relative attractiveness of equity returns
compared to returns on bank accounts, especially given the fixed interest
rates that prevailed in the 1980s.69 But why did additional equity investment come through mutual fund investment during the period?
Although mutual fund transaction fees declined, as reflected in the rise
of no-load funds, so did the transaction costs of direct stock ownership
with the end of fixed commissions in 1975.70 A recent cross-country study
of eight advanced economies observes a trend of “shifting stock ownership shares from households to financial institutions” and attributes this
change to tax policies that favor such investing, for example, tax-favored
retirement accounts. 71 In the United States, tax-favored treatment of
defined contribution plans has surely led to such indirect ownership.
Households’ investment through 401(k) accounts, for example, is
channeled into investment intermediaries. Yet as noted above, many
investors own mutual funds outside of choice-constrained accounts.72
Indeed, individual mutual fund ownership is commonly less tax-efficient
than direct equity investing. Mutual funds are “flow-through” vehicles for
tax purposes, and individuals are required to pay tax on net gains
realized by the fund even when the fund is selling stock to meet others’
redemption requests.73
A capital market innovation supplies the link: the application of
Markowitz’s Nobel Prize-winning theory on the efficiency of meanvariance investing, which gives rise to the portfolio theory.74 The lessons
were (i) diversification improves risk-adjusted returns; (ii) the broader
the portfolio, the greater the diversification; and (iii) since secondary
markets in seasoned equities are highly efficient, research that adds value
is expensive and its fixed cost is best spread across large portfolios. All of
this argues for investing through investment intermediaries that can
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 66, at 15 (“[B]ank savings accounts lost their allure as
the government-mandated cap on interest rates failed to keep pace with inflation.”).
70. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1975) (prohibiting national securities exchanges and
their members from “charg[ing] . . . any fixed rate of commission for transactions effected
on . . . such exchange”).
71. Kristian Rydqvist, Joshua Spizman & Ilya Strebulaev, The Evolution of Aggregate
Stock Ownership 2, 36–37 (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/57351/1/66759728X.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
73. See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry,
139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469, 1478–83 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Elements] (surveying
regulation and taxation of mutual funds).
74. Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments 3
(1959); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77, 77 (1952).
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assemble diversified portfolios as the low-cost way to follow this strategy.
Index investing is the limit,75 but the debate over whether households
should exclusively invest through such lowest-cost vehicles may obscure
the major change, which is that households increasingly invest through
diversification-providing intermediaries, mutual funds.
C. The Reconcentration of Ownership
The peculiar position of institutional investors in the reconcentration of ownership of U.S. public corporations can be seen most easily
from the governance role played by mutual funds, both because of their
size and homogeneity, and because of the extensive information that is
available concerning their governance activities. Three characteristics are
most telling: one with respect to power, one with respect to reticence,
and one with respect to responsiveness. First, mutual funds are potentially powerful: They hold a large percentage of U.S. equities. Over
recent years, mutual funds held approximately 25% of the outstanding
stock of publicly traded U.S. corporations.76 Given the concentration in
the mutual fund industry,77 twenty-five mutual fund families hold the
voting rights for some 18.75% of outstanding U.S. equities.78 Thus, by
any measure, mutual funds have the power to be a significant force in the
governance of large U.S. corporations.79
75. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment
Law, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1, 1 (defining index investing as “creat[ing] and
hold[ing] essentially unchanged a portfolio of securities that is designed to approximate
some index of market performance such as the Standard & Poor’s 500”).
76. ICI, 2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 12 fig.1.5, 102.
77. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining concentration in mutual
fund industry).
78. The calculation is based on the following two facts. In 2011, the largest twenty-five
mutual fund families represented 73% of mutual fund assets under management. ICI,
2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 25. In total, mutual funds held approximately 25% of
U.S. domestic equities. ICI, 2012 Fact Book, supra note 63, at 12 fig.1.5.
79. In fact, it is likely that the discussion in the text quite significantly understates the
voting power of the firms that advise mutual funds. The figures in the text reflect only the
holdings of retail mutual funds, likely because the most available source of data on mutual
fund holdings comes from the Investment Company Institute, whose data is limited to
advisors registered as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
At the same time, the advisors to mutual funds also manage separate accounts for other
institutional investors, like pension funds. These represent a very large concentration of
assets. For example, of the $3.673 trillion assets under management by BlackRock, the
largest asset manager in the United States, $1.045 trillion is in retail mutual funds and
$1.483 trillion is in separate accounts managed for institutional investors. If overall mutual
fund advisors manage in separate accounts as many assets as they do for mutual funds, and
if the allocation to domestic equities is the same for separate accounts as it is for mutual
funds, then the advisors control the voting of roughly twice the percentage of shares
shown in the text. The breakdown of the character of BlackRock’s assets under
management comes from self-reported data provided by BlackRock to eVestment. (The
figures here are calculated by the authors based on proprietary data of eVestment.)
eVestment, EVestment Report on Funds Under Management by Category 2011 (on file
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Second, mutual funds are at least on the surface anything but
proactive. For example, during the 2009 proxy season, the proxy statements of Russell 3000 corporations contained 20,434 proposals to be
voted upon by shareholders. 80 Of these, shareholders proposed 646
(3.2% of all proposals); the remainder were proposed by management.81
In turn, during the 2007 to 2009 proxy seasons, mutual funds proposed
only eighty-four (4.5% of all shareholder proposals).82 The last step in
this analysis is the character of the proposals mutual funds did make:
Sixty-seven (80% of all mutual fund proposals over the same period) concerned social and environmental issues,83 presumably proposed by socalled socially responsible funds. Thus, over the 2007 through 2009
proxy seasons, mutual funds offered only seventeen (0.9%) shareholder
proposals addressed to corporate governance or performance issues.84 To
be sure, mutual funds may be proactive in less visible ways, quietly
persuading portfolio companies to take desired actions with the threat of
making a shareholder proposal in the background; however, given the
limited voluntary action by companies on such matters as requiring a
shareholder vote to adopt a poison pill, the magnitude of that effort at
least strongly suggests that mutual funds are reluctant to undertake
proactive engagement, whether openly or behind the scenes.
Third, while mutual funds are not proactive, they are not passive in
the Berle-Means sense: They very frequently oppose management on
core corporate governance issues. The most extreme example concerns
voting on antitakeover matters—poison pills and staggered boards—and
illustrates the extent to which mutual funds vote against management
recommendations when the issue is presented to them. Over the 2004
and 2005 proxy seasons, mutual funds voted in favor of shareholder
proposals to require shareholder approval before adopting a poison pill
almost 80% of the time, and in favor of proposals to declassify the board
of directors 90% of the time.85 The same results appear for the 2003
through 2008 period: Mutual fund voting in favor of shareholder
proposals to declassify the board reached 87.4%,86 and with respect to

with authors); see also eVestment, https://www.evestment.com/about/company (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) (providing data and analytical
tools to institutional investors).
80. Inv. Co. Inst., Trends in Proxy Voting by Registered Investment Companies 2007–
2009, 16 Res. Persp., Nov. 2010, at 4 fig.1 [hereinafter ICI, Trends in Proxy Voting],
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per16-01.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 8 fig.6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Morgan et al., supra note 45, at 920 tbl.2.
86. Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 45, at 38.

888

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:863

shareholder proposals to require shareholder approval for a poison pill,
68.4%.87
D. The Puzzle of What to Do with Institutional Investors
The reconcentration of ownership of U.S. equities in intermediary
institutions has resulted in conflicting views of the corresponding governance structure. On the one hand, concentration of ownership holds out
the possibility that the institutions will, like Pinocchio, come to act like
real boys—like “real” owners (or “stewards” in the more polite vocabulary)88 and actively supervise the performance of professional management. This view is reflected in current discussions in, for example, the
European Union, the United Kingdom, and Israel 89 concerning how
institutions can, and might be made to, play a more proactive role in
corporate governance. On the other hand, institutions have continually
failed to play this role; despite the urging of academics and regulators,
they remain stubbornly responsive but not proactive.90 Capital market
evolution thus has concentrated governance rights in fewer hands, which
despite continual urging, conversely appear to have little interest in
playing or capacity to play an active stewardship role in portfolio
company governance. The next Part considers how the combination of
agency capitalism and the complementary limitations of intermediary
competence and incentives results in an undervaluation of governance
rights.

87. Id. at 44 tbl.5A. The percentage given in the text is the weighted average of the
mutual fund voting in favor of proposals supported by ISS (89.5%, 21,699 proposals) and
those not supported (21.9%, 9,870 proposals). To look at another measure: “Withhold
votes” for management’s director nominees have somewhat increased over the 2007 to
2009 period because of concerns about executive compensation, although the overall level
of support (approximately 90%) is still high. See ICI, Trends in Proxy Voting, supra note
80, at 11–12 fig.8, 14.
88. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing “stewardship” proposal in
United Kingdom).
89. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (discussing U.K., E.U., and Israeli
proposals).
90 . For example, some twenty-two years ago, institutions were urged to help
nominate a minority of directors who were both independent of management and
dependent on shareholders. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 881–85
(1991) (arguing current proposals on improving governance were limited because “they
merely make outside directors independent of management, rather than dependent on
shareholders,” and proposing creation of new position of “professional outside director”
which would satisfy both criteria). The proposal still attracts comment but not action. See
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Directors Guild, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2009, at
A19 (advocating proposal of “independent professional directors” after U.S. Treasury
bailed out private corporations).
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III. WHY INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP WILL UNDERVALUE THE VOTE AND
CREATE NEW AGENCY COSTS
As our analysis thus far has shown, the mechanisms of risk transfer
and the resulting change in the distribution of ownership are driven by
the evolution of capital markets or political economy factors like pension
reform. The need to develop complementary corporate governance
innovation follows. In the United States, institutional investors collectively have become the majority owners of most large public firms.91 This
is because of two sets of factors: public and private decisions over how
best to mobilize and protect retirement savings,92 and private decisions in
favor of a particular organizational form for investors to achieve diversified wealth management.93
In theory such institutional ownership should mitigate the managerial agency cost problems of the Berle-Means corporation. Fewer owners,
larger positions, more sophistication—the combination should reduce
coordination costs and spontaneously generate more active monitoring.
Reality has fallen short, however, as demonstrated by Part II’s account of
institutions’ peculiar form of passivity. Mutual funds and other for-profit
investment managers are almost uniformly reticent—very rarely proactive
but responsive to others’ proposals.94 Public funds are more likely to be
proactive but largely limited to governance matters rather than firm
strategy or implementation. 95 At most, institutions might engage in
“governance activism,” not “performance activism.”
One way to frame the question then is to ask why institutions place
so little value on the vote that, despite their collective majority holdings,
they largely choose to be responsive to the initiatives of others. More
engaged firm-specific voting could reduce managerial slack at specific
firms; perhaps, more grandly, it could improve performance across an
entire portfolio and, in theory, enhance social welfare by improving
resource allocation throughout the economy.
What accounts for the missed gains that would come with the full
exercise of governance rights? The answer, we think, stems from the
agency costs of agency capitalism, rooted in the institutions’ desire to
deliver competitively superior performance for their beneficiaries
(pension funds) or shareholders (mutual funds) while minimizing costs.
This competitive pressure will lead institutions to focus externally and
91. See supra Table 1 (showing institutional ownership of largest U.S. corporations in
2009, ranging from 63.7% of top fifty corporations to 73% of top thousand).
92. See supra Part II.A.
93. See supra Part II.B.
94. See supra Part II.C–D.
95. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1057–62 (2007) (explaining how
relatively low pay and incentives, political constraints, and conflicts of interest inhibit
public funds from pursuing aggressive activist strategies).
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internally on relative performance. Such performance metrics do not
readily accommodate much shareholder activism, especially performance
activism, even though it would be in the beneficiaries’ (shareholders’)
interest for the institutions to pursue value generation in this way.
Take first the case of mutual funds (including separate accounts
managed by mutual fund advisors)96 and other private wealth managers.
Fundamental analysis, which identifies poor governance that affects
performance or a poor business strategy, has a dual use: It could be used
as the premise for a shareholder intervention to improve the situation or
to provide a trading opportunity. A successful intervention will produce
benefits enjoyed by all shareholders, including the mutual fund’s
competitors. But a shared gain, unlike the private gain of a successful
trade, provides little competitive advantage to the proactive investment
manager whose portfolio products and services are chosen in
comparison to competitors offering similar products or services. In an
environment in which fund managers are evaluated in relative terms,
absolute performance will play a secondary role.97 Investment managers
thus have little private incentive to address proactively strategy and
performance problems at portfolio companies and therefore do not develop
the expertise to engage in that activity, even if such activity would benefit their
beneficiaries.98 This gap between the beneficiaries’ and the fund’s interests
represents a particular kind of agency cost that is of special concern
because it interacts with the more familiar species of agency cost: This
agency cost locks in managerial slack at the portfolio companies.
Together these are the “agency costs of agency capitalism.”99
96. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text (discussing share ownership of
mutual funds).
97. Absolute performance is not irrelevant, of course, since flows in and out of all
funds are affected by general stock market trends, as demonstrated by large outflows from
equity funds in the post-fall 2008 period. An individual fund has little influence over such
secular trends. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (observing high correlation of
stock price volatility following financial crisis).
98. Investment companies are further constrained by the limit on the number of
shares they can hold in a portfolio company. For example, pass-through taxation is
available to mutual funds only if they do not hold more than 10% of the voting securities
of a portfolio company. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a5b(1) (2006) (providing requirements for “diversified management company”); see also
I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (defining regulated investment companies); id. §
11(c)(3) (exempting regulated investment companies from taxation on corporate
income). In this respect, it is important to note that this restriction applies to individual
mutual funds, rather than to entire fund families like Fidelity or Vanguard. From this
point, however, things get complicated (or, perhaps, interesting). The Investment
Company Act of 1940 does not recognize the existence of fund families, so the board of
directors of a mutual fund owes duties only to the shareholders of a particular fund,
undiluted by the interests of other funds within the fund family. This disconnect between
the law and the organization of the industry has gone largely unexamined.
99. Cf. Isaksson & Celik, supra note 35, at 31 (“[A] great majority of intermediary
investors actually lack the incentives to exercise their ownership functions.”); Kay, The Kay
Review, supra note 7, at 42 (“In the current market environment both analysis and
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Take next the case of pension funds. Pension funds do not have to
compete for funds because their beneficiaries are locked in—California
public employees cannot opt out of CalPERS. Yet assuming these funds
are acting in good faith, pension fund beneficiaries will be in roughly the
same position as mutual fund shareholders. The pension fund trustees
will be looking for internal or external portfolio managers who deliver
superior relative returns at the lowest cost.100 And these agents will face
the same strong disincentives to make governance investments that will
not redound to their competitive advantage. In effect, the good-faith
monitoring by investment intermediaries of the relative performance of
their portfolio managers reinforces the agency costs of agency capitalism.
We can now turn to our central claim: The agency costs of agency
capitalism will result in the chronic undervaluation of governance rights.
Effective use of governance rights requires firm-specific investigation and
firm-specific activism, both of which are costly and will be undersupplied
by institutional investors.
First, the logic of diversification cuts against governance activity. No
single stock accounts (or, in the case of a mutual fund, can account) for
a significant portion of either the fund’s portfolio or the outstanding
stock of the portfolio company,101 so even highly successful interventions
(say a 10% stock price improvement) will have so small an effect on
portfolio returns that the opportunity cost of the capital expended might
engagement have something of the character of public goods—most of the benefits accrue
to people who do not undertake them.”). Both reports note the tension between
beneficiaries’ and institutions’ interests, but neither addresses the role of activist investors.
Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act
and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1, 8–12 (2010) (noting “separation of ownership
from ownership” but focusing on share turnover rate and skeptical of role of activist hedge
funds).
100. A recent study of U.K. pension funds finds that “the vast majority” delegate
investment management in a manner that will “predispose pension funds to give primary
emphasis to fund investment performance rather than an engaged approach to
ownership.” Anna Tilba & Terry McNulty, Engaged Versus Disengaged Ownership: The
Case of Pension Funds in the UK, 21 Corp. Governance: Int’l Rev. 165, 166 (2013). In
general pension funds have increasingly moved to a decentralized model, in which
specialist managers are hired to pursue specific investment strategies. See David Blake et
al., Decentralized Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry, J. Fin.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9–11), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.120
24 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing empirical evidence).
101. See supra note 98 (noting 10% limit on percentage of shares mutual funds can
hold in portfolio company). For a description of mutual fund diversification/anticoncentration rules, enforced through both the 1940 Investment Company Act and
contemporaneous tax legislation, see Roe, Political Elements, supra note 73. Roe argues
that these requirements arose from characteristic efforts throughout U.S. history to limit
the potential power of financial intermediaries. See id. at 1470–71. More recently, John
Morley argues that mutual funds lobbied for these restrictions to “brand” themselves as
passive, low-risk investors. John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment
Management Regulation, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 341, 345 (2012).
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well exceed the gains.102 This “no (or negative) effect” relative performance problem is particularly evident in the maximally diversified
portfolio of the index investor, but it will be an inhibitory factor for all
diversified investors. Additionally, the success of governance intervention
is probabilistic, both in terms of whether the objective is attained (e.g.,
board turnover or the sale of a division) and whether the performance
effect will be positive. Yet the costs incurred will, with certainty, reduce
the fund’s returns. A benefit-cost calculation typically will point to de
minimis governance expenditures by the diversified intermediary institution.103 Further, even if the intervention is successful and cost-justified, it
still may degrade relative performance. Start with an index fund. The
gains will be enjoyed by all other index investors, except that the activist
fund will have incurred costs that lower its net relative performance.
Next take an actively managed fund. In order to benefit relatively, it must
overweight a company it has identified as poorly managed. If it succeeds,
it will earn some positive returns (net of costs) that may give it some edge
relative to some of its competitors (especially those who underweighted
the stock), but diversification limits the relative gains. On the other
hand, if the initiative fails, it may be facing losses on its overweight
holdings in a company it has credibly identified as poorly managed.
These losses come on top of the costs for the campaign—not a very
promising calculus. This begins to sound like a brief for the Wall Street
Rule: If the issuer is badly run, sell the stock and fire the portfolio
manager.104
102. As an example of the impact of these diversification/anticoncentration rules,
imagine a governance intervention that increases the value of the portfolio company. The
fund’s ability to benefit is limited both in the percentage of the company it may own (less
than 10%) and the fraction that this investment may represent of the fund’s total
portfolio. Assume a major position by the fund, 3% of total assets, that represents a 5%
ownership interest in the portfolio company, and an intervention that results in a 10%
gain in the portfolio company’s stock price. The gain in the fund’s assets will be 0.3% (a
10% increase in a 3% position); 95% of the benefit from the fund’s actions goes to others,
yet the fund may pay 100% of the costs, which will reduce its 0.3% gain. In such
circumstances, the fund may be better off (meaning, will be more likely to increase assets
under management and thus fees) by spending the cost of the governance intervention on
marketing. In some cases, governance intervention may serve as marketing. See
BlackRock, Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment at BlackRock: Annual
Review 2011 (2011), available at http://www2.blackrock.com/content/groups/global/
documents/literature/1111157291.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing
governance practices and policies in investment management company’s marketing
material).
103. On the cost constraints and other disincentives to institutional investor activism,
see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 595–608
(1990) (providing classic account of “institutional money manager incentives and conflicts
of interest” and “evidence on how these conflicts alter patterns of voting and activism”);
Kahan & Rock, supra note 95, at 1047–70 (discussing incentives to monitor and conflicts
of interest of mutual funds, hedge funds, and public pension funds).
104. Robert Pozen, then a senior executive at Fidelity, made this point twenty years
ago at a conference attended by the authors, whose focus was on encouraging institutional
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Second, the institution’s internal mechanisms for monitoring
portfolio performance, based on benchmarking or performance relative
to peers, cut against activist exercise of governance rights. Keep in mind
that this is not the result of institutions’ misunderstanding as to what
investors actually want. For-profit institutions like mutual funds have
learned that investors follow relative performance and direct assets
accordingly. Pension funds also follow relative performance in selecting
and monitoring portfolio managers, whether in-house or external. Such
relative performance evaluation falls out of contemporary portfolio
theory. 105 Factors that ramify market wide—for example, the recent
financial crisis, to pick an extreme example of a general phenomenon—
affect a portfolio “systematically.” Such risks are not readily diversifiable,
if at all. Therefore, the performance question is comparative: Given the
state of the economy, how does this portfolio compare to “unmanaged”
portfolios in the same “space”? A portfolio manager can outperform by
omitting or underweighting (relative to market capitalization) a stock
from his or her otherwise diversified portfolio.
This has implications for shareholder activism. The process by which
the portfolio manager acquires and uses information is not focused on
identifying opportunities when the activist exercise of governance rights
can improve company strategy. The portfolio manager’s mission is to
determine how the current stock price matches his or her best estimate
of the future stock price; that judgment determines a decision to buy,
sell, or hold. Information comes in continuously; the comparative evaluation occurs continuously. A diagnostic thought process—what sort of
shareholder intervention would improve performance—is simply a
different inquiry. Next, assume that the portfolio manager decides that a
portfolio company is underperforming. The most assured way to grab the
value of that insight is selling the stock rather than incurring the costs
and speculative future benefits of a shareholder intervention. That is, the
fact of poor governance or poor management at a portfolio company
may be an element in comparative evaluation, but the indicated action
for the institution—but not its beneficiaries—may be to “sell,” not to
“intervene.”
Third, the institutions’ compensation structures have a complicated
relationship to any form of shareholder activism. For mutual funds, the

investor governance action. If Fidelity found itself invested in a company that was badly
managed, Pozen said, the portfolio manager had made a mistake. For Fidelity, the key was
not to make the mistake in the first place. See Michael T. Jacobs, Break the Wall Street
Rule: Outperform the Stock Market by Investing as an Owner 12 (1993) (describing “the
Wall Street Rule” as “the common practice of selling your shares when you are dissatisfied
with the performance of a company”).
105. For a recent effort to incorporate the impact of fund flows as a result of relative
performance on portfolio strategy, see Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, An Institutional
Theory of Momentum and Reversal 2 (Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305671 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Investment Advisers Act of 1940 sharply limits the compensation that a
fund’s shareholders can pay—that is, the incentive structure of the fees
that Fidelity mutual funds pay to Fidelity.106 It would be very difficult to
reward a fund with an incentive-based fee tied directly or indirectly to the
returns from a particular kind of investment management activity. On
the other hand, superior relative performance is the major driver of a
fund’s profitability. Superior performance draws new assets that can be
charged a fixed fee (no incentives), yet the fund’s largely fixed investment costs mean that the fund’s profits sharply increase with fund size.107
As a result, there is no special incentive for activism, meaning that no
reason exists to devote internal resources to the activist use of governance rights as opposed to pursuing other ways that might improve
portfolio performance. But there would be a powerful incentive to
engage in activism if it delivered returns that would improve the relative
performance of the fund. The dearth of this activity suggests that while
potential gains from activism may exist—there is ample evidence of
managerial slack—the institutional investor’s business model makes it an
unlikely candidate to pursue those gains.
Fourth, evaluation alternatives to benchmarking, based on
“absolute” returns, may push portfolio managers even further away from
the granular evaluation that maps onto firm-specific activism. This style
of investment focuses on asset allocation and regards equities as merely
one among many asset classes that a portfolio manager can draw from; it
invites macro- rather than microanalysis. In environments of high macroeconomic uncertainty, this strategy may contribute to high correlation
among stock price movements. The observed high correlations of the
post-financial crisis period108 thus undercut the business case for institutional activism. If firm-specific performance is submerged in general
market movement, this will lower the expected returns to activism.
Intermediary institutional investors, then, present a problem for
corporate governance. This efficient risk transfer and management
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b) (2006) (allowing compensation based on performance
of fund “averaged over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately
with [its] investment performance . . . in relation to the investment record of an
appropriate index of securities prices”); Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Christopher R.
Blake, Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds, 58 J. Fin. 779, 780 (2003) (describing Investment
Company Act’s constraints on mutual fund incentive fees, which require “fulcrum fee”
arrangements that reward good performance and penalize bad performance
symmetrically).
107. That is, the decision costs associated with a particular portfolio investment are
mostly fixed. Size determines the assets over which those costs will be distributed. As assets
increase, costs as a percentage of assets and as a percentage of the management fee paid
by the investor will decrease. The firm’s profit margins increase with size and so does its
profitability.
108. See Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and
Share Price Unpredictability: Reasons and Implications 63 (Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding dramatic increase in firmspecific volatility following all financial crises since early twentieth century).
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structure—delivering low-cost, high-powered diversification and scale
economies in active management—gives rise to significant problems in
the efficient assignment of governance rights. As in the standard BerleMeans analysis, beneficial owners are rationally passive; governance
rights are of little value to them. Institutional owners who are not seeking
private benefits of control are rationally reticent;109 they also will assign a
low value to governance rights since their proactive exercise will not
improve the relative performance on which the institutional investor’s
profitability and ability to attract assets depends. As a result, institutions
can be expected to be skilled at managing portfolios, not at developing
more profitable alternatives to a portfolio company’s business strategy,
creating better governance structures for the firm, or mastering the skills
of governance activism. The institutions’ performance, and hence their
success in attracting funds and earning profits, is evaluated by the performance of their portfolios, measured in comparative terms. In light of the
mismatch between skills and incentives with respect to active company
management, as opposed to portfolio management, governance rights
will be chronically undervalued.110
Thus, we need to take seriously the governance environment created
by the joint forces of capital market evolution and political economy,
which at this moment can be described as “latent” activism (using
Mancur Olson’s terminology to refer to voters that are susceptible to
organization because of well-defined common interests but are passive
because of mobilization costs), and look for useful adaptations.111 Costs,
lack of expertise, and incentive conflicts reduce the value of governance
rights in the hands of intermediary institutions.

109. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text (noting mutual funds are not
proactive in governance issues but respond to activists’ governance proposals).
110. This account of mutual funds’ (and similar intermediaries’) incentives provides
a sounder basis for corporate governance theorizing than some recent models put forth in
the finance literature. For a summary of this literature, see Amil Dasgupta & Giorgia
Piacentino, The Wall Street Walk When Blockholders Compete for Flows 1–7 (June 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1848001 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). For further discussion of our perspective on current finance
scholarship on institutional investor selling behavior, see infra note 132.
Gerald Davis has similarly observed the reconcentration of share ownership yet the
passivity of institutional owners. Davis, supra note 66. His explanation is somewhat
different (conflicts of interest) and somewhat complementary (relatively short holding
periods). See id. at 19 (finding Fidelity and American Funds “routinely liquidate[] very
large ownership positions”); id. at 20 (noting conflict of interest between investment
management and pension businesses). Recent evidence on conflicts of interest is mixed.
See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Voting Through Agents, supra note 45, at 6–7 (noting studies on
mutual fund conflicts of interest “arrive at inconsistent results”). Relatively short holding
periods are consistent with our account, in which institutional investors’ business model
would lead to sales rather than governance activism at firms that institutions decide are
mismanaged.
111. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 125–31 (1971).
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IV. ACTIVISTS AS GOVERNANCE ARBITRAGEURS
Investment intermediaries have arisen to facilitate the channeling of
retirement savings into capital markets and to provide individuals with
the advantages of diversified portfolios. These investment intermediaries
specialize in managing risk, adding to and taking advantage of increasing
capital market completeness. But this specialization, reinforced by the
link between scale and profitability, may leave a governance gap, an
embedded shortfall in the monitoring of managerial agency costs.
Institutional investors have little appetite for an active governance role;
in consequence, they are unlikely to have developed the additional skills
suited to it.
This gap, however, creates an arbitrage opportunity. Instead of pushing institutional investors into roles for which they may be unsuited, we
should expect specialization. Addressing the governance gap—the
agency costs of agency capitalism—plausibly requires a new set of actors
to complement the diversified investment and portfolio optimization in
which intermediary institutional investors now engage. Such actors would
develop the skills to identify strategic and governance shortfalls with
significant valuation consequences, to acquire a position in a company
with governance-related underperformance, and then to present reticent
institutions with their value proposition: a specified change in the
portfolio company’s strategy or structure.
Once the issue is framed and presented, the undervaluation of
governance rights is reduced: The institutions will vote (or indicate
willingness to vote) in favor of the specialized actors’ perspective if the
issue is framed in a compelling way. We see such specialized actors in the
capital markets—activist investors of various types—and indeed a complicated interaction between the actors and the institutions has arisen
whose shape has been described in a recent comprehensive study by
Nickolay Gantchev of 1,164 activist campaigns over the 2000 to 2007
period.112 It is interesting that the activists often achieve their stated
objectives, but not invariably: They succeed in approximately 29% of the
cases.113 As we elaborate below, an activist campaign is best seen as a
multistep process, the outcome of which critically depends on the extent
to which the activist can garner significant institutional support for the
proposed actions. The public campaign is a backdrop to the behind-thescenes shareholder plebiscite. Shareholder activists make their strategic
proffers; the relevant institutional investor constituency is willing to
consider and assess them.
112 . Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. Fin. Econ. 610 (2013).
113. Id. at 620 tbl.3 (finding highest success in pursuing sale or privatization of
target, restructuring of inefficient operations, and additional disclosure, but less in
obtaining higher dividends or repurchases, CEO removal, and executive compensation
changes).
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From our perspective, responsibility to beneficial owners for
maximizing performance is split between specialists: Activist investors
specialize in monitoring portfolio company strategy and formulating
alternatives when appropriate for presentation to the institutional
investors; in turn, institutional investors specialize in portfolio management and in evaluating proposals presented by activist investors. This
specialization is more efficient than having a single actor play both roles.
Each requires a different business model, and combining them may
degrade the performance of both.
This specialization addresses both sides of the agency capitalism
triangle depicted in Figure 1. Activist shareholders are not controlseekers, in the sense that they are neither motivated by the pursuit of private benefits of control, nor do they anticipate actually managing a
portfolio company. Rather they are governance entrepreneurs, arbitraging governance rights that become more valuable through their activity
monitoring companies to identify strategic opportunities and then
presenting them to institutional investors for their approval—through a
proxy fight, should the portfolio company resist the proposal. By giving
the institutions this choice, the activists increase the value of governance
rights; the institutions’ exercise of governance rights then becomes the
mechanism for creating value for beneficial owners.114
The point of tangency between these two specialists is that both
activist and institutional shareholders must agree for a proposal to go
forward. While activist investors frame and seek to force governance/performance changes, they are successful only if they can attract
broad support from institutional investors capable of assessing alternative
strategies presented to them, even if they will not formulate the strategies
themselves. In effect, activists must make their case to sophisticated but
not proactive governance rights holders.115 Such a reactive role is a more
plausible model for institutional investor engagement, reflecting both
their expertise and incentives.116 This interaction between intermediary
114. For a survey of evidence showing value creation for target shareholders by
public hedge fund activism and evidence showing similar gains through private activism in
Europe, see Marco Becht, Julian Franks & Jeremy Grant, Hedge Fund Activism in Europe
5, 20–24 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 283, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616340 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115 . See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text (providing evidence that
institutional intermediaries are “rationally reticent”).
116. Critics might object that this sort of specialization overly empowers the proxy
advisory services, especially ISS, because of the extent to which institutions have de facto
outsourced shareholder voting decisions, a strategy that economizes on governance costs.
For a survey of literature on the role of ISS recommendations, see supra note 45. But even
sharp critics of the general role of ISS regard the institutions as engaging in different
decisionmaking in “votes with clear economic significance (such as mergers or election
contests).” Latham & Watkins LLP, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and
Institutional Voting 1 (2010), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf
/pub3446_1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Such decisions are made by
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institutions and shareholder activists, each with complementary specialized capacities, thus can mitigate the agency costs of agency capitalism
through a mechanism that complements the reconcentration of record
ownership.
This happy complementarity requires an adequate supply of shareholder activists, and thus the focus shifts to the return to activist shareholders: It must be high enough when the activists are right—that is,
when the intermediary institutions agree with the proffered strategy and
the strategy in fact works—to warrant their effort, in light of the facts that
the bulk of the gains from their effort will be captured by other shareholders, and that their efforts will not always succeed. 117 Gantchev’s
recent work sheds light on the costs of hedge fund activism and its
returns. A campaign that culminates in a proxy contest costs nearly $11
million on average, he estimates.118 When costs are taken into account,
economically focused portfolio managers, not by centralized governance specialists who
work from normative premises about value creation. See id. Recent evidence suggests that
ISS’s influence may well be overstated. See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Proxy Advisors, supra
note 45, at 906.
117. A recent client letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a leading proponent
of restricting activist shareholders, stated:
[S]everal significant victories by boards of directors and corporations over
activists could reduce hedge funds’ appetite for activism or alter their tactics or
target selection criteria. AOL, Forest Laboratories and Cracker Barrel all
successfully defended against months-long proxy fights . . . . Companies have
succeeded in proxy fights by focusing on their business strategy, highlighting
positive changes, whether financial or in corporate governance, and pointing
out when the dissident had no long-term business strategy.
Andrew R. Brownstein et al., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Mergers and Acquisitions—
2013, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Feb. 4, 2013, 9:48 AM)
[hereinafter Wachtell 2013 Client Letter], http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2013/02/04/mergers-and-acquisitions-2013 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This is
just the kind of constructive interplay that complementary specialization contemplates:
The activists may propose, but the institutions dispose.
118. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 623 tbl.7A. Gantchev models hedge fund activism
as a sequential process and attaches costs to each stage, beginning with demand
negotiations ($2.94 million on average), then requesting board representation ($1.83
million on average), and finally, waging a proxy contest ($5.94 million on average). Thus,
the average amount of costs for a campaign that goes through each stage is $10.71 million.
Id. Of the 1,164 campaigns Gantchev tracked in the 2000 to 2007 period, only 7% resulted
in a proxy contest. Id. at 618 tbl.1. But approximately 57% of these proxy contests resulted
in activist success (meaning the attainment of the ultimate stated objective, which was not
necessarily a board seat). Id. at 620 tbl.3B. In cases where the activist demanded board
representation (the second stage, representing less than 20% of the sample), the success
rate was approximately 39%. The initial intervention, styled a “demand” for negotiation,
had the lowest success rate at approximately 7%. Id.
Gantchev also replicates prior literature that reports evidence inconsistent with hedge
fund “short termism,” the conventional criticism that “hedge fund activists [are] shortterm investors who make a quick profit at the expense of long-term shareholders.”
Excluding campaigns in which the activist made no formal demand, the average duration
of an activist campaign is nineteen months. Id. at 621. The variation around that average
skews to the right, however; the seventy-fifth percentile for a campaign with specific
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nominal hedge fund returns are on average cut by approximately twothirds. 119 These benefit-cost considerations become important when
considering the regulatory framework within which activism operates.
In this analysis, the specialization of institutional investors in
portfolio management—including assessing proposals presented by activist shareholders—and the specialization of activist shareholders in
actively monitoring management performance and strategy and proposing alternatives are complementary, a result of the evolution of conditions in the capital markets. The rise of intermediary institutional investors and the corresponding reconcentration of ownership result in both
the undervaluation of governance rights and the corresponding opportunity for activist shareholders to arbitrage that valuation differential. Yet
this is not a classic arbitrage opportunity because the payoff depends
upon both the credibility of the activist and the persuasiveness of its
proposal to the controlling institutional shareholders.120
The average activist block is roughly 8%, far less than a control
block.121 When the activist nonetheless succeeds, what is the source of the
success? It is unlikely that the activist shareholder bedazzles management
with the astuteness of its strategic and operating proposals. In cases
where management adopts some or all of the activist’s proposals without
a proxy contest, management presumably believes that the activist can
persuasively address the institutional investors who own a majority of the
firm. In cases where the activist pursues a proxy contest, the vote is a
plebiscite that requires shareholder approval of the activist’s proposals.
demands is twenty-six months, and the twenty-fifth percentile is six months. Id. at 621
tbl.4A. The average initial ownership stake at the beginning of a campaign is 8%, which
increases only to 9% over the course of the campaign; apparently the size of the activist’s
ownership stake does not affect the probability of success (where success is defined in
terms of initial demand outcomes). Id. at 621, 622 tbl.5A.
119. Id. at 625 tbl.8C, 626. Much like the case with venture capitalism, skill in
identifying situations where activism can both produce returns and succeed is not
randomly distributed. The top quartile of activists earns most of the returns. Id. at 625
tbl.8. It is also likely that more successful activists will take on large firms. Success brings
more resources, which means capacity to acquire “activism” blocks in bigger firms.
Activism costs do not increase much with firm size. See supra note 107 and accompanying
text (noting decision costs of portfolio management are fixed). Thus, assuming available
resources to make the block acquisition, larger firms should be targeted by the more
successful activists.
120. This is consistent with empirical literature showing that activists are likely to
target firms with significant institutional ownership, and in evaluating otherwise equivalent
firms are more likely to target the firms with higher institutional ownership. See Alon Brav
et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin.
1729, 1750 tbl.III (2008) [hereinafter Brav et al., Activism and Firm Performance] (noting
target firms on average have about 45% institutional ownership); Gantchev, supra note
112, at 622 tbl.6, 623 (“[T]argets have significantly higher institutional ownership, which is
a critical determinant of campaign success in the more confrontational stages of
activism.”).
121. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 622 tbl.5A; see also Brav et al., Activism and Firm
Performance, supra note 120, at 1747 tbl.IIA (noting median initial ownership is 6.30%).
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In short, governance markets become more complete through interactions in which activists propose and institutional investors dispose.
Recent empirical work is consistent with this account. Gantchev
models the sequential process of governance activism and describes the
frequency of each stage.122 First, the activist shareholder assembles a toehold position, acquiring shares at a price as yet unaffected by the
activist’s plans. Public knowledge of the activist’s efforts comes with the
filing of a statement on Schedule 13D that discloses the activist’s greaterthan-5% ownership stake and its intentions and objectives.123 Next comes
the “demand negotiation” stage, in which the activist seeks to persuade
target management to voluntarily adopt the activist’s proposal. If this
fails, then a “board representation” stage begins, in which the activist
threatens a proxy contest and recruits director nominees. Should
management still refuse to adopt the proposal, the final step is an actual
contest.124 Of particular interest is the declining frequency of each stage
and the increasing success rate at the later stages.125 For example, of the
initial 13D filings by hedge fund activists, only approximately 30% go to
the negotiation stage.126 This pattern is consistent with the interaction we
posit. After public posting of a bond (the toehold investment) to
establish its credibility and secure the chance of its return, the activist
undertakes a nonpublic campaign to elicit a favorable institutional
response.127 Subsequent actions reveal the outcome of such efforts. With
approbation, the activist proceeds; without, it withdraws, realizing that
the chances for success are low. The relatively low fraction of initial
interventions that proceed to the next stage suggests a high burden of
persuasion for institutional support.
Gantchev also shows that the success rate (as measured in terms of
initial demands) increases as the activist persists.128 Presumably this is
because the activist evaluates the likelihood of success at each stage in
122. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 612–14.
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2012) (requiring any person acquiring beneficial
ownership of any equity security of more than 5% to file with SEC statement on Schedule
13D within ten days after acquisition); Gantchev, supra note 112, at 613 (explaining
announcement of activist intentions as initial step).
The activist shareholder’s predisclosure acquisition of a significant toehold is critical
to its business model. The timing of required disclosure thus directly affects the activist’s
expected returns. Part V below considers current proposals to accelerate the disclosure
requirement and thereby limit the activist’s return by reducing the amount of
predisclosure stock that can be acquired.
124. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 613–14.
125. Id. at 620 tbl.3B.
126. Id.
127. See Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a
Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3093, 3108–11 (2009)
(suggesting shareholder activism is predominantly executed through private interventions
both with target management and with other institutions). Just as sometimes the best
auctions are silent, so too are activism campaigns.
128. Gantchev, supra note 112, at 620 tbl.3B.
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deciding whether to continue, and the target makes the same assessment
at each stage as it seeks out information about institutional sympathy for
the activist’s proposals.
There is a growing empirical literature that documents the impact of
activist shareholder efforts on target company stock prices. Gantchev
reports average (median) “raw” shareholder returns of approximately
39% (33%) over the average nineteen-month campaign period and
average (median) annualized market-adjusted returns of approximately
4% (4%).129 Brav et al. report average (median) raw target shareholder
returns of 42% (18%) over the campaign period and annualized average
(median) market adjusted returns of 21% (4%).130 Klein and Zur report
average target shareholder market-adjusted returns of approximately
22% over a one-year post-initiation period.131
Part III has shown that the agency costs of agency capitalism arise in
significant part from the specialization of intermediary institutions in
providing beneficial owners low-cost diversification at the cost of a
business model that does not value governance rights. This Part then
shows that specialization by activist investors in arbitraging the value of
governance rights—the difference between the value of institutions’
governance rights before and after the intervention of an activist
investor—may be part of the cure. Institutional investors specialize in
portfolio selection and performance; activist shareholders specialize in
framing alternatives to existing company strategies and thereby increasing the value of governance rights to institutional investors. In effect,
capital market evolution has broken up the ownership bundle between
rationally reticent institutional investors and potentially activist shareholders. To support effective governance, the legal regime needs to
foster conditions in which the bundle can be reassembled through the
complementary capacities and engagement of both.132 Part V turns to
129. Id. at 625 tbl.8, tbl.4A.
130. Brav et al., Activism and Firm Performance, supra note 120, at 1760, 1761
tbl.VI.A.
131. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge
Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. Fin. 187, 188, 226 (2009). Although hedge fund
targets experience higher returns upon 13D filing than other activists’ targets, the reverse
is true for subsequent gains; at the end of the year, the totals are approximately the same.
Id.
132. As an alternative mechanism, others have suggested pass-through voting by the
holders of beneficial interests in investment intermediaries. See, e.g., Richard M.
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57
Brook. L. Rev. 1, 47–52 (1991) (discussing pass-through voting by pension fund
beneficiaries); Taub, supra note 45, at 888–89 (extending suggestion to mutual fund
shareholders). Such suggestions seem highly likely to fail because of the original BerleMeans problem: the passivity of dispersed owners.
Gantchev and Jokikasthira propose an alternative hedge fund/institutional investor
interaction, in which institutional exit reduces an issuer’s stock price and may also signal
an underperformance problem. This in turn may trigger an activist intervention. See
Nickolay Gantchev & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Hedge Fund Activists: Do They Take Cues
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present regulatory initiatives that would skew the balance against the
control of the agency costs this Article has identified.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REGULATORY REGIME
The sustainability of the collaboration between institutional
investors and activist shareholders depends on the regulatory regime that
governs the activists’ accumulation of shares. The activist incurs costs: the
research necessary to identify an opportunity to improve a target’s
business strategy; the financing and opportunity costs of its equity
position; the idiosyncratic risk resulting from holding an undiversified
position; and the costs of the activist campaign, from engagement with
the target to the costs associated with a proxy contest, including legal
counsel, proxy advisors, solicitation costs, and the like.133 The activist
needs to anticipate recovering these costs and earning a favorable riskadjusted return before it will enter the business in the first place and
engage with identified companies.
The cost recovery and the profits come from the returns on the
activist’s toehold equity position secured before public disclosure of that
position and the activist’s plan. Consider alternative sources of cost
recovery. A contract with institutional owners to cover expenses or share
gains would both incur significant coordination costs and entangle the
institutions in the regulatory regime that covers share accumulations, an
unattractive scenario.134 The target is also an improbable source of cost
from Institutional Exit? 23 (Feb. 12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2139482 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding “strong
positive relationship” between institutional selling volume and chance of being targeted by
activists). From our perspective, even if the institutional investor’s exit can be seen as a
governance device, it requires a complementary action by an activist in order to be most
effective.
Thus we may see the emergence of a new ecology for the monitoring of managerial
underperformance. The signal associated with institutional selling reduces the activist’s
investigation costs; the subsequent activist intervention increases the value of the
institutions’ voting rights. Even if the selling institution will not benefit from the particular
intervention (because it has exited from its position), its beneficiaries will benefit from an
environment of superior monitoring. The potential triggering of activist intervention adds
to the governance value of the institutional decision to exit. Integrating the role of the
activist investor amplifies the expression of institutional “voice” as recently developed in
the finance literature. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk”
and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2645 (2009)
(observing blockholder selling exerts influence through effect on management’s stockrelated compensation). A compensation effect is a relatively “weak form” of governance
check; by contrast, drawing in a shareholder activist is a “strong form” of governance
check. The institutional/activist interaction magnifies the governance impact of
institutional selling and lowers the activist’s cost of target identification.
133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing average costs of activist
campaign).
134. Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Regulation 13D-G
promulgated thereunder make it clear that any such agreement would render all parties
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recovery. Precisely because the activist’s campaign typically is not to elect
a board majority, the activist cannot anticipate that a post-proxy fight135
friendly board would elect to reimburse its expenses. An activist’s pursuit of adoption of a shareholder bylaw calling for reimbursement of
136
proxy contest expenses, newly permitted under Delaware law, is both
highly speculative and dilutes the activist’s single minded campaign to
increase the target’s stock price and thus the activist’s credibility. The
activist’s return depends on stock price appreciation, gains that are
shared pro rata with other shareholders.137
In a “success” case, the activist’s return is a function of the size of its
block and the increase in the target’s stock price as a result of the target’s
adoption of the proposal, whether voluntarily or following a proxy
contest. A great deal of empirical evidence shows that the target’s stock
price immediately appreciates upon disclosure of the activist’s block,
depending importantly on the expectation that the activist has a substan138
tive policy proposal. This appreciation increases with the activist’s
members of a “group” that is deemed to have beneficial ownerships of the shares of all
such parties. If the group owns more than 5% of an issuer’s outstanding stock, group
members have a filing obligation. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)
(2012). This will impose costs and liability risks on all parties who have entered into the
agreement.
135. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairfield Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293
(N.Y. 1955) (holding board may, though is not required to, reimburse successful proxy
contestants in proxy fights over corporate policy).
136. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 113 (2012).
137. Cf. supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining institutional investor
would have to share benefits from intervention with competitors but would bear all costs).
138. See, e.g., Brav et al., Activism and Firm Performance, supra note 120, at 1760
(“The large average abnormal stock return around the Schedule 13D filing date is
consistent with the view that the market anticipates that hedge funds’ activism will result in
actual value improvement.”); Klein & Zur, supra note 131, at 188 (summarizing studies
that suggest “the market believes activism creates shareholder value”). For earlier studies
on potential control entrepreneurs, see Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan,
Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 555, 562–
63 (1985) (finding first public announcement by “corporate raiders” of their
stockholdings led to positive abnormal returns); Wayne H. Mikkelson & Richard S.
Ruback, An Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Process, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 523, 533
(1985) (“The announcements of [13D] filings appear to increase the stock price of both
acquiring and target firms.”). For a useful survey, see generally Alon Brav, Wei Jiang &
Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 Found. & Trends Fin. 185 (2009)
[hereinafter Brav et al., Review].
There is debate over the source of gains associated with hedge fund activism.
Greenwood and Schor suggest that the gains come almost exclusively from subsequent
takeovers. Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. Fin.
Econ. 362, 368–70 (2009). This seems at odds with the extended average holding period
documented by Brav et al. See Brav et al., Review, supra, at 205 (finding average holding
period of hedge fund activist’s position is “close to two years”); supra note 118 (discussing
Gantchev’s study which reports average duration of activist campaign is nineteen months).
More recently, Brav, Jiang, and Kim used plant-level data drawn from the U.S. census to
show that improvements in production efficiency at target firms and efficiently redeployed
capital are significant channels for the realization of activist-associated gains. See Alon
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reputation for successful engagement;139 the immediate market reaction
anticipates a very large fraction of the gains associated with a successful
activism campaign. These dynamics make the regulatory choices over the
timing of disclosure critical: The activist’s business model depends on
being able to secure a large enough equity position before required
disclosure of that position drives up the price of the target’s stock. Thus,
the centrality of the disclosure regime sets the context for understanding
regulatory initiatives in the United States and the European Union to
accelerate the disclosure of the activists’ initial positions. These initiatives
contain three elements: reducing the ownership threshold that triggers
disclosure, shortening the period for disclosure following the ownership
trigger being hit, and limiting the use of equity derivatives by including
them in calculating the ownership amount.140
Each of these elements will have the effect of reducing the returns to
activist shareholders. This is because they will reduce the economic stake
that an activist shareholder can accumulate before mandatory disclosure
of its holding drives up the price of the target company’s stock. As noted
previously, toehold acquisitions are the major source of the activist’s return;141 these regulatory initiatives would reduce the returns to activism.
It is not just that smaller blocks would undermine the activist’s credibility
and thus effectiveness. Rather, and more importantly, reducing the size
of the toeholds that activists can accumulate before disclosure reduces
their returns. The likely outcome would be that the activist sector would
shrink, fewer firms would be identified as targets for strategic initiatives,
and the activists would reduce costly campaign efforts. The result would
be greater undervaluation of voting rights because of the reduced attraction of arbitraging the difference in the value of governance rights to
reticent institutional investors and to an activist shareholder.142
Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity,
Risk, and Product Market Competition 27–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17517, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17517.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
139. See Emanuel Zur, The Power of Reputation: Hedge Fund Activists 29–30 (Dec.
15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267397 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding higher announcement premium associated
with hedge funds’ reputation for being successful in gaining board seats).
140. See infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory initiatives
by U.K. and E.U. authorities); infra notes 146–147 and accompanying text (discussing
proposals in United States).
141. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text (explaining toehold position is
essential to cost recovery by activists because alternative sources of gain are not
satisfactory).
142. This can be understood as a particularized application of Grossman and
Stiglitz’s demonstration that capital markets cannot be perfectly “informationally
efficient”; arbitrageurs would no longer engage in the activity that impounds information
into price if inefficiency did not allow an arbitrage profit. See Sanford J. Grossman &
Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ.
Rev. 393, 405 (1980) (“[B]ecause information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the
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The United Kingdom and the European Union have moved far
down this road. The United Kingdown has adopted an ownership
disclosure threshold of 3% and a two-day disclosure requirement. 143
Comparable initiatives are also underway in other E.U. member states
144
and Canada. From our perspective, there is considerable irony in this

information which is available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would
receive no compensation.”). Reducing the returns to activist investors would similarly
reduce their efforts to move the value of the company toward its fundamental efficiency.
143. For disclosure rules in the United Kingdom, see Fin. Servs. Auth., Disclosure
Rules and Transparency Rules §§ 5.1.2, 5.8.3 (2013), available at http://media.fshandboo
k.info/content/full/DTR.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (requiring
shareholder to notify U.K. issuer of percentage of shareholder’s voting rights when it
“reaches . . . 3% . . . and each 1% threshold thereafter up to 100%” in no later than two
trading days).
144. For Germany’s maximum four-day lag, see Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel
[WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBl. I at 2708, § 21(1), last amended by
Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBl. I at 1126, art. 3, translated in Securities Trading Act,
BaFin: Fed. Fin. Supervisory Authority, http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht
/EN/Gesetz/wphg_101119_en.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited
Apr. 23, 2013) (“Any party . . . whose shareholding in [a German] issuer . . . reaches,
exceeds or falls below 3 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, 25 percent,
30 percent, 50 percent or 75 percent of the voting rights . . . shall . . . within four trading
days . . . notify . . . the issuer and . . . the Supervisory Authority . . . .”). For France’s fourday provision, see Code de Commerce [C. Com.] art. L. 233-7, translated in The French
Commercial Code in English 262–63 (Philip Raworth trans., 2009) (requiring any person
who comes into possession of shares representing more than 5% of issuer’s voting rights to
inform issuer within time limit set by Council of State); General Regulation of the Autorité
des Marchés Financiers art. 223-14 (last amended Sept. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/7552_1.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (specifying Article L. 233-7 notification shall be filed no later than close of
trading on fourth trading day after shareholding threshold has been crossed). For Italy’s
five-day maximum, see Regulation Implementing Italian Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24
February 1998, Concerning the Discipline of Issuers art. 121, available at
http://www.consob.it/documenti/english/laws/reg11971e_2009_art.116-ter_121.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Declarations of holding . . . shall be made without
delay and in any event within five trading days of the date of the transaction leading to the
obligation . . . .”).
For a discussion and critical analysis of actions and proposals throughout Europe to
require disclosure of equity derivative positions, following the U.K. model, including a
recent consultation by the Committee on European Securities Regulation (CESR), now
the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA), see Maiju Kettunen & Wolf-Georg
Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives—An Intentions-Based
Approach 16 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 36, 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844886 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Canada has proposed revisions to its ownership disclosure regime that would drop
the triggering percentage from its current 10% level to 5%. Canadian Sec. Adm’rs,
Proposed Amendments to MI 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, NP 62-203 TakeOver Bids and Issuer Bids, and NI 62-103 Early Warning System and Related Take-Over
Bid and Insider Reporting Issues (Mar. 13, 2013), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/d
ocuments/en/Securities-Category6/mi_20130313_62-104_take-over-bids.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). The Canadian proposal would leave in place the obligation to
file the disclosure report two days after reaching the trigger and to report subsequent
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position. On the one hand, the United Kingdom in its Stewardship Code
and the European Union in comparable measures both seek greater
institutional investor engagement with portfolio companies. 145 In our
view, this effort is likely to fail, since it conflicts with the institutions’
business model. On the other hand, the analysis in Part IV highlights
shareholder activism as addressing the agency costs of institutional
ownership—the undervaluation of governance rights that, if exercised,
would benefit the beneficial owners—by creating a new channel for
otherwise reticent institutional voice. In effect, shareholder activism is
what the stewardship movement desires but cannot achieve on its terms.
Because institutional investors ultimately decide whether an activist’s
campaign will succeed, activism potentiates institutional voice by putting
choices to the institutions. Reducing the size of a predisclosure stake that
an activist shareholder can acquire has precisely the wrong effect:
Reducing the returns to activist shareholders would reduce the number
of strategic initiatives by activist shareholders and ultimately result in
reticent intermediary institutions continuing to undervalue governance
rights. So in sidelining activist investors, the United Kingdom and the
European Union are also sidelining the institutions—just those whose
roles are simultaneously sought to be expanded into stewardship.
A. Proposal of Reducing the Ownership Threshold and Shortening the Disclosure
Window
The SEC has received recent importuning to follow the United
Kingdom and various other countries in shortening the disclosure
window and broadening the definition of beneficial share ownership to
146
cover purely economic positions generated by derivative trades. The
SEC has signaled that its current position—a ten-day disclosure period
and a more restrictive definition of beneficial ownership—may be
147
reconsidered. Because the authors write as American legal academics,
increases of more than 2%. The proposal would extend the updating obligation to
decreases of more than 2%. Id.
The proposed amendments to the Canadian disclosure regime would also expand the
instruments included in calculating a shareholder’s ownership for purposes of the
disclosure trigger to encompass derivatives, such as total return swaps. It would also
require lenders of securities to report loans of more than 2% of an issuer’s outstanding
shares. Id.
145 . See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing U.K. and E.U.
proposals).
146. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 1–2 (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Wachtell Petition],
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (requesting SEC to “shorten the reporting deadline and expand the
definition of beneficial ownership under the reporting rules” under 1934 Act).
147. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §929R(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1866 (2010) (amending section 13 of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and specifically authorizing SEC to reduce trigger period for
disclosure); Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the
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this Article will address the proposals made to the SEC with more specificity; however, some of the policy proposals here have carryover value
for other jurisdictions.
Part of what animates the proponents of faster disclosure after the
activist crosses the disclosure-triggering threshold is the concern that
activists can accumulate ownership positions far in excess of the 5%
threshold during the current ten-day period before disclosure is
required.148 There are anecdotes to this effect, although evidence shows
that activists on average take blocks under 10%.149
There are two objections to activists more aggressively exploiting the
ten-day window. First, public shareholders who unknowingly sell to the
activist are disadvantaged, because they are selling at a price that excludes the potential benefits of the activist’s initiative.150 Second, the
activist may be able to accumulate a control position or at least a position
of strong influence without paying a control premium, or for reasons
that threaten majoritarian shareholder interests.151 As discussed below,
these are weak arguments or point to problems otherwise readily
addressed in the U.S. setting.
The first objection fails on the stating of it. A shareholder’s decision
to sell results either from liquidity needs or the shareholder’s reservation
price for the security in question. Any asymmetry of information involved
in the transaction arises from the activist’s private information about its
own intentions, which may include a forecast as to the likely target firm
response. Why does the selling shareholder have an entitlement to share
in the value of information created by the analysis of other investors? The
thin logic of an argument whose goal is to facilitate a free riding strategy
becomes even clearer when the question is examined from the ex ante
shareholder perspective, a familiar analytic approach. Assume that share-

Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2011/spch121511mls.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting SEC
planned to review and modernize beneficial ownership reporting rules, including whether
to shorten ten-day window and whether to include use of cash-settled equity swaps).
148. See Wachtell Petition, supra note 146, at 2–3 (arguing statutory purposes of
13(d) reporting requirement are disserved by investors exploiting ten-day reporting
window to accumulate shares at lower price).
149. Gantchev’s analysis of 1164 campaigns over the 2000 to 2007 period shows that
the activists’ mean (median) stock ownership position at the outset of the campaign was
8.5% (7.0%). Gantchev, supra note 112, at 622 tbl.5A. In the seventy-fifth percentile,
initial ownership was still only 10%. In the ninety-fifth percentile, initial ownership was
16%. Id. Interestingly, the initial ownership for successful campaigns was on average
6.81%, less than the 7.16% for unsuccessful campaigns. Id. at 622 tbl.5B.
150. See Wachtell Petition, supra note 146, at 6 (arguing disclosure lag “result[s] in a
substantial transfer of value to [activists] . . . from the public shareholders who sold their
shares during the ten-day window without knowledge of the [activists’] plans”).
151. See id. at 3 (arguing ten-day reporting lag “serves the interest of no one but the
investor seeking to exploit this period of permissible silence to acquire shares at a discount
to the market price that may result from its belated disclosures”).
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holders are diversified (or have the opportunity to diversify) and that
whether one is a selling shareholder or a holding shareholder is unbiased. Immediate disclosure will restrict the activist’s opportunity to
build a toehold stake, thereby reducing the returns to activism, and thus
the occasions for activism and the net gains to other shareholders from
the activist’s revaluation of institutional shareholders’ governance rights
across a portfolio of firms. Shareholders ex ante would presumably
prefer a rule that increased their average wealth, even if in a particular
case they lost an opportunity to free ride on the activist’s efforts. The
shareholders can’t have it both ways: A regulatory structure that gives
shareholders the opportunity to free ride on knowledge of activists’
strategies reduces the shareholders’ opportunity to gain from the activists’ strategic monitoring and presentation of strategic alternatives to
reticent institutions.
Shareholders would have the same view of the current SEC rule that
allows institutional investors who do not seek to influence control to
delay public disclosure of their accumulation of positions in a company
until they have completed the acquisition. 152 For example, the SEC
allowed Berkshire Hathaway to delay reporting its acquisition of a significant stake in IBM stock because disclosure of the stake would have made
it more costly for Berkshire Hathaway to acquire it in the first place.153
Since shareholders as a group benefit from Berkshire Hathaway’s
accumulation, premature disclosure would hurt rather than help.154
152. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(3) (2006)
(allowing SEC to exempt institutional investment manager or security from reporting
rules); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(a)(1) (2012) (requiring certain “institutional investment
managers” who exercise “investment discretion” to file report on Form 13F with SEC
“within 45 days after the last day of each . . . calendar quarter[]”); Form 13F, Report of
Institutional Investment Manager Pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, id. § 249.325.
153. See Serena Ng, Erik Holm & Spencer E. Ante, Buffet Bets $10.7 Billion in the
Biggest Tech Foray, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/S
B10001424052970204323904577037742077676990.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“Berkshire secretly had been accumulating the shares . . . receiving confidential
treatment from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which otherwise mandates that
big investors disclose their holdings . . . .”).
154. Thus we have concerns about the recent rulemaking petition of the NYSE
Euronext and management-side governance groups seeking a shortened reporting
deadline for postquarter disclosure of institutional investor ownership positions, see supra
note 152, from forty-five days to two days. NYSE Euronext, Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys &
Governance Prof’ls & Nat’l Investor Relations Inst., Petition for Rulemaking Under
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 9–10 (Feb. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2013/petn4-659.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Although transparency as to institutional ownership positions is generally
desirable, it needs to be balanced against potential harms to those who own shares
through an institutional intermediary. As noted in the text, if the institution is in the midst
of position-building or unwinding, the fortuity of a quarter ending point ought not to
impose extra costs. Such a concern applies to “reticent” institutions as well as “active”
institutions who have not entered the special disclosure regime of section 13(d). Among
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To be sure, the first objection may have in part motivated Congress
to adopt section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act in 1967.155 We
know now more about how capital markets work than was known in 1967,
however, and in all events, the issue is not the repeal of any disclosure
regime governing share accumulations, but whether the SEC should extend the reach of the current regime—a decision within the SEC’s discretion, rather than simply a blind application of congressional intent in
1967.156 In this context, congressional intent does not have a forty-fiveyear-long shadow.157
The second objection—that the activist may be seeking to acquire
control, near-control, or at least overwhelming influence in the ten-day
window—should be taken more seriously but with a caveat. In the
decades of various forms of shareholder activism since the adoption of
the current disclosure regime, the instances of significant block building
in the ten-day window are relatively few.158 This is in part because rapid
significant accumulation becomes known to market intermediaries and is
159
impounded in the price, thus undercutting the economic rationale for
other considerations, forcing immediate postquarter disclosure will distort trading
patterns as the quarter-end approaches. To avoid harm, a shortened disclosure deadline
would need to be coupled with a reaffirmed waiver policy.
155. This claim of legislative intent is vigorously presented by Emmerich et al., supra
note 13 (manuscript at 4–9) (reviewing legislative history of Williams Act and noting
explicit congressional mandate for transparency and full and fair disclosure of large
accumulations of public company stock).
156. This, of course, assumes that “congressional intent” as manifested in anything
other than the statutory text is a meaningful interpretive guide, a premise that the current
fashion for “textualism” might contest. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 640–56 (1990) (outlining tenets of “new textualism”
and discussing criticisms of traditional approach relying on legislative history); John F.
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 420, 424 (2005) (noting
modern textualists “deny that Congress has a collective will apart from [statutory text]” but
believe “the only meaningful collective legislative intentions are those reflected in the
public meaning of the final statutory text”).
157. In a similar vein is Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs’ recent invitation
to rethink elements of the state’s case law in light of changing patterns of share ownership
and other capital market conditions. Jack B. Jacobs, Does the New Corporate Shareholder
Profile Call for a New Corporate Law Paradigm?, 18 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 19, 26–31
(2012).
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (noting small ownership at outset of
activist campaigns).
159. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 569–72 (1984) (“[E]ven a single knowledgeable trader with
sufficient resources[] can . . . cause prices to reflect information by persistent trading at a
premium over ‘uninformed’ price levels.”). Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that
rapid accumulations without significant price impact will be difficult for all but the
highest-liquidity stocks. See Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Vyacheslav Fos, Do Prices Reveal the
Presence of Informed Trading? 35 fig.3 (Aug. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023629 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(showing activists gradually accumulate their pre-13D blocks on high-volume trading
days). This evidence is consistent with market participants’ views that significant, sudden
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accumulation, and also because the activist’s idiosyncratic risks are
increasing in investment size. Remember that a genuine governance
entrepreneur, not a control seeker, requires approval of its proffered
strategy by sophisticated investors after having heard the target
company’s vigorous argument on the other side. Failing that, the
campaign itself will fail, leaving the activist with large potential losses.160
And emphasizing the importance of changes in the capital markets
and corporate governance over the last forty-five years, private ordering
(with the not insubstantial assistance of the Delaware Supreme Court)
already provides a response to the concern about secret control changes
that deprive shareholders of a premium. The poison pill affords a
remedy that can effectively prohibit undisclosed accumulations.161 The
authors hardly endorse the “just say no” version of the pill, which is
162
seemingly blessed by the Delaware courts, but a time-limited pill
share acquisitions would materially move market prices. See, e.g., Christopher R.
Concannon, Virtu Financial LLC, Remarks at Columbia Program on the Law and
Economics of Capital Markets: High Frequency Trading (Nov. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/capital-markets/cap_mktsWorkshops2
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting significant price impact from large, even
medium, orders in present market and particular shortfall in liquidity for stock beyond
top 1000).
160. See Wachtell 2013 Client Letter, supra note 117 (noting in 2013 companies like
AOL, Forest Laboratories, and Cracker Barrel successfully defended against months-long
proxy fights because institutional investors were not persuaded by activists).
161 . The standard “flip-in” “shareholder rights plan” establishes an ownership
threshold (commonly between 10% and 20%), the crossing of which will trigger massive
dilution of the acquiror’s position. For periodic updates on pill practices, see
SharkRepellent.net, http://www.sharkrepellent.net (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Apr. 23, 2013). A critical feature in most pills is that the definition of
beneficial ownership either tracks the “acting in concert” provisions of the SEC’s 13D-G
regulations or broadens them. See Steven M. Davidoff, Netflix’s Poison Pill Has a
Shareholder-Friendly Flavor, N.Y. Times DealBook (Nov. 6, 2012, 2:14 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/netflixs-poison-pill-has-a-shareholder-friendlyflavor (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[C]ompanies have adopted group language
like ‘acting with conscious parallelism,’ ‘acting in concert’ or ‘cooperating’ in order to
prevent activist hedge funds from working together.”); cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–3(b) (2012)
(including within definition of “beneficial owner” any person who “creates or uses a trust,
proxy, power of attorney, pooling arrangement or any other contract, arrangement, or
device . . . to evade . . . section 13(d) or (g) of the Act”). The effect of such pill provisions
is to make it difficult for significant shareholders to collaborate on an activist initiative.
See, e.g., Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. 11,510, 1990 WL 114222, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
1990) (upholding pill provisions that would include committee participation, forming
joint slate, or expense sharing within definition of acting in concert). SharkRepellent.net
reports that the largest fraction of recent pill adoptions, which were not routine but
responsive to specific threats, have been in connection with activism and control issues.
John Laide, 2012 Poison Pill Impetus, SharkRepellent.net (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.
sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=undefined&pg=/pub/rs_20121127.html&2
012_Poison_Pill_Impetus&rnd=369637 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
162. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) (holding
target board’s adoption of poison pill was not preclusive but “a proportionate defensive
response to protect its stockholders from a ‘low ball’ bid”); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.
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authorized by shareholders rather than unilaterally adopted by
management, a form of “chewable pill,” would address this potential
163
problem. A threshold of 15% or 20% would accommodate activism
without opening the way to the accumulation of a control block.164
One way to read the current campaign to compel quicker disclosure
of shareholder accumulations is as an effort to persuade the SEC to
impose the equivalent of a poison pill with a very low trigger at a time
when institutional investors are successfully pressuring boards to turn
away from poison pills. There is a history here. The genius of the poison
pill was that shareholder approval was not necessary; all that was necessary was board approval.165 In the not-so-distant past, almost all firms
could be assumed to have pills, either already adopted or subject to
adoption at a moment’s notice; in effect, a virtual pill. But, in no small
measure because institutional investors came to oppose pills, when
proposals to redeem them come to the shareholders, more boards have
let pills lapse, or have not adopted them, even when a control battle may
be brewing.166
Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 127–29 (Del. Ch. 2011) (Chandler, C.) (holding Delaware law
permitted retention of pill even after incumbent board lost election proxy contest and
shareholders had more than one year to consider bidding offer); Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal
Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 491, 493–501
(2001) (reviewing Delaware case law).
163. In this form, the pill would be a contractual version of the Delaware Chancery
Court’s preferred position with respect to the pill announced initially in City Capital
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798–800 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(holding target board’s decision not to redeem poison pill was unreasonable because it
would “in effect permanently foreclose their shareholders from accepting a noncoercive
offer for their stock,” a threat “far too mild to justify such a step”), overruled by
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) (rejecting Interco
approach because “it would involve the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a
‘better’ deal for that of a corporation’s board of directors”). The Delaware Chancery
Court recently reaffirmed its preference in Interco in Airgas, while acknowledging the
contrary controlling Delaware Supreme Court view. 16 A.3d at 101.
164. Other barriers to rapid accumulation of equity positions are also significant. For
example, for large capitalization firms, the requirement to file under section 7A of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006), which is keyed to the value of the stock acquired
rather than the percentage of outstanding equity acquired, will often limit the toehold to a
level far short of that allowed under § 13(d). This, in turn, makes the issue of extending
the computation of beneficial ownership under § 13(d) to derivatives more important. See
infra Part V.B. The current thresholds are set forth at Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds of
the Clayton Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 2406 (Jan. 11, 2013).
165. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom:
Burke Versus Schumpeter, 60 Bus. Law. 1419, 1431 (2005) (“It is not far fetched to claim
that, were a shareholder vote to be required, very few firms now could secure approval of a
broadly framed poison pill.”).
166. Andrew L. Bab & Sean P. Neenan, The Conference Bd., Inc., Poison Pills in
2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename
=TCB%20DN-V3N5-11.pdf&type=subsite (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Over the
past decade, fewer and fewer public companies have maintained traditionally structured
poison pills.”).
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Moreover, although the rare circumstance may validate a low
threshold (5%) pill, 167 higher triggers are much more prevalent, 168
reflecting both expectations about unstated judicial limits and board
reluctance to take an extreme position in the face of institutional
investor opposition. Shortening the disclosure period would go far
toward capping the activist’s ownership stake, not because of a legal
prohibition against acquiring more, but because the economics would
militate against it. And it is at this point that the promanagement beauty
of the proposed SEC action to accelerate disclosure under the Williams
Act emerges from the cloud of advocacy. From the perspective of those
urging lower and quicker disclosure triggers at a time when neither the
shareholders nor the board will adopt a pill trigger that is directed at
activist shareholders, the proposed SEC rule change will impose it on all
corporations without the approval of either shareholders or boards. Put
differently, the SEC would be adopting a regulatory pill directed at
activist shareholders at precisely the moment that boards, increasingly,
would not adopt one—a genuine coup for those who prefer not only
more protection for management from its shareholders, but now more
protection from its board as well.169
B. Proposal of Including Economic Exposure Through Derivatives
The second policy question posed by the proposal to the SEC relates
to whether, independent of the timing of disclosure, economic exposure
generated through derivatives should count within the definition of
beneficial ownership for determining the disclosure threshold.170 Here
the issue is not the accumulation of shares with voting rights, but the
acquisition of a purely economic interest. The technique provides economic returns to the activist shareholder on its activity without watering
167. See Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 601–06 (Del. 2010) (finding
target’s “adoption of a 4.99% trigger for its Rights Plan would not preclude a hostile
bidder’s ability to marshal enough shareholder votes to win a proxy contest” and was
reasonable response to threat of change in control and loss of company’s net operating
loss carryforwards); Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on
the Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 Ind. L.J. 1087, 1098–1111
(2012) (discussing Selectica and its implications).
168. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 13, at 56 (showing in recent survey 85% of
805 public companies that have pills in place have ownership threshold of higher than
10%, while 24% have pills triggered by higher than 15%).
169. Emmerich et al. cleverly but unpersuasively argue that boards’ reluctance to
adopt pills is a reason for the SEC to act. See Emmerich et al., supra note 13 (manuscript
at 15–16).
170. See Wachtell Petition, supra note 146, at 7–9 (proposing SEC expand definition
of “beneficial ownership” under Regulation 13D-G to include ownership through
derivatives); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §766(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1799 (2010) (providing sale or purchase of
security-based swaps constitutes beneficial ownership only to extent that SEC deems it so
by rule); cf. supra note 144 (discussing proposals to require disclosure of derivative
position in E.U. member states and Canada).
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down the critical test that the activist must survive to earn that return—
the approval of the institutional shareholders.
The easiest way for the activist shareholder to achieve an economic
interest divorced from voting rights that could influence the corporation’s response to the proffered strategy is through a cash-settled “total
return swap,” in which the party taking the long side of the swap gets exactly the return of the equivalent equity position without actually holding
or obtaining the shares.171 The swap is a bet about the movement of the
stock price. When the swap is unwound, the parties settle up. Stock
appreciation results in a cash payment of the gains to the activist; a stock
price decline requires the activist to pay out the losses on the deemed
position to the counterparty.
In theory, this should be unobjectionable as a policy matter in four
separate respects. First, the activist is doubling down on its investment
without gaining additional voting leverage to force the adoption of its
proposal. This reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior by the activist
or other forms of private benefit extraction because the bet increases
while decision rights do not. The separation of cash flow rights from
control rights goes in the direction that tilts against the activist’s goals if
those goals are defined as securing voting rights. Second, for the institutional shareholders who ultimately decide whether to support an
activist’s proposal, the fact that the activist takes a greater economic stake
based solely on the performance of the stock is a credible signal of a
high-quality proposal: It increases the size of the activist’s bet on its
proposal without influencing the corporation’s decision whether to
accept it. Third, for the activist, the synthetic stock position increases its
returns from its toehold equity investment and thus encourages the
investment in the first place. Fourth, for shareholders generally, the
opportunity for higher returns to the activist through proposals that are
screened by disinterested institutional decisionmakers will increase the
occasions of high-quality shareholder activism, thereby generally
reducing the agency costs of agency capitalism.
172
173
As developed in the literature and one important case, a major
concern is that a total return swap in practice can convey voting rights in
171 . See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 13 J. Corp. Fin. 343, 344 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Decoupling]
(explaining cash-settled equity swap); infra notes 172–173 and accompanying text
(explaining total return swaps can give voting rights in addition to economic interest).
172. See Alon Brav & Richmond D. Mathews, Empty Voting and the Efficiency of
Corporate Governance, 99 J. Fin. Econ. 289, 289 (2011) (“[S]ome funds may use ‘empty
voting’—a practice whereby they accumulate voting power in excess of their economic
share ownership—to manipulate shareholder vote outcomes and generate trading
gains.”); Hu & Black, Decoupling, supra note 171, at 344–45 (describing “decoupling” of
economic ownership from voting power via derivatives); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black,
The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 811, 828–32 (2006) (same); Kahan & Rock, supra note 95, at 1075–77 (describing
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addition to an economic interest and thereby undercut the policy behind
the 5% ownership disclosure trigger. Moreover, assembling this transthreshold economic stake can occur with relatively low visibility, such that
it will not activate the self-checking mechanism of block building
through market purchases. 174 This is because the “short” swap
counterparties will hedge their position by “going long” the stock, that is,
through stock purchases.175 And because of their client relationship with
the activist, the argument is that counterparties will not be unbiased in
their behavior: They will vote in favor of the activist’s proposal in an
effort to sustain relationships with their client.176 Moreover, the stock is
available for acquisition whenever the activist chooses. The activist has
control over the timing of the swap’s unwinding. When the swap is unwound, the counterparties want to reverse their hedge, the sooner the
better, and the activist stands ready to buy the blocks and the vote.177
The analysis here is a “possibility theorem.” Counterparties claim not
to behave in this way and are especially sensitive after the federal district
court’s opinion in CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management
(UK) LLP.178 Nevertheless, the SEC is called to arms to avoid this scenario
through an amendment of the Regulation 13D rules to include even
purely economic stock positions, as through cash-settled swaps and other
derivatives, within the scope of beneficial ownership and so further limit
“empty voting” as result of derivative position as “example of an old problem—conflict of
interests created by exploiting the separation of legal and beneficial ownership—
aggravated by modern financial innovation”); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy,
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 775, 780 (describing as “economically
encumbered” shareholders who lack “homogenous incentives” because they “hold both a
share and a short or other derivative position”); Wolf-Georg Ringe, Hedge Funds and RiskDecoupling—The Empty Voting Problem in the European Union, Seattle U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135489
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing examples and problems of empty voting
in United States and European Union); Michael C. Shouten, The Case for Mandatory
Ownership Disclosure, 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 127, 160–63, 170–72 (2009) (discussing
“hidden ownership” and “empty voting”).
173. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 519–
23 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining mechanism and purposes of total return swaps), aff’d, 292
F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011).
174. By “self-checking,” we mean that increases in stock price associated with
sustained direct purchasing will commonly impose practical restraints for activists seeking
to profit from price appreciation in the blocks they acquire. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text (explaining how share accumulation is impounded in market price).
175. See CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 541–42 (explaining swap counterparties are not “in
the business . . . of taking on the stupendous risks entailed in holding unhedged short (or
long) positions in significant percentages of the shares of listed companies” and “their
positions could not be hedged through the use of other derivatives”).
176. See id. at 545–46.
177. See id. at 546.
178. See id. at 552 (holding defendant’s total return swap position constituted
“beneficial ownership” under Rule 13d-3 because it had ability to influence voting,
purchase, or sale decisions by swap counterparties).
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the size of the economic stake an activist can take in support of its
strategy.179
We have two responses. First, in the post-Dodd-Frank world,
counterparties may come to lose their hypothesized behind-the-curtain
power to deliver votes and shares. Equity derivatives may come to be
traded on exchanges, or the process of central clearing may interpose a
central clearing party between the two sides to the trade.180 In other
words, hedging may come to be effected quite differently, in a way that
drastically reduces the possibility of hidden votes. The SEC should at
least wait to see how that plays out before defining beneficial ownership
in a fashion that is dictated only by beliefs concerning the informal
operation of the derivatives market and the relationship between
transacting parties.
Second, the SEC could address the issue more narrowly and more
directly simply by defining beneficial ownership to exclude a total return
swap that has been “sterilized” through a mirrored voting commitment
with respect to any proposal or proxy contest mounted by the activist
counterparty. In a sterilized swap, the counterparties are obliged to cast
their votes to mimic the voting behavior of the disinterested shareholders. This proposal preserves the advantages of letting activists
increase the size of their economic bet on their proposal, while still protecting section 13(d)’s policy of restraining the possibility of sudden
control shifts.
In the end, the case in favor of accelerating the disclosure of an
activist shareholder’s toehold stake is a claim that the legislative history
that animated the Williams Act and section 13(d), based on the structure
of the capital markets forty-five years ago, should dictate the SEC’s exercise of its discretion now in the face of radically different capital markets
and after the reconcentration of share ownership that has given rise to
agency capitalism. 181 Figure 4 illustrates the mismatch between this
argument and current conditions.

179. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (outlining such proposals).
180. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–81 (2010) (requiring persons engaging in swap
transaction to “submit[] such swap for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization” and
requiring swap transactions subject to clearing requirements to be executed on “board of
trade designated as a contract market” or “swap execution facility”). The SEC has recently
finalized certain rules for security-based swaps, which include equity derivatives, in a
release that provides useful background. See Process for Submissions for Review of
Security-Based Swaps for Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing
Agencies, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,601 (July 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
181. See supra notes 155–157 and accompanying text (discussing argument based on
legislative history).
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FIGURE 4: SETTING THE CONTEXT
Institutional Ownership as a
Percentage of Total U.S. Equities
Williams Act
12.8%

1960

1967

Wachtell Petition

19.3%

50.6%
73% of top 1,000

1970

2009

2011

In 1967, institutional investors collectively owned a relatively small
percentage of U.S. equities. Stock ownership was still largely in the hands
of individuals. The governance problem was that of Berle and Means:
managers who were not accountable to widely dispersed shareholders. As
Part II shows, the evolution of the capital markets over the last forty-five
years has reconcentrated ownership: Institutional investors now own 73%
of the largest one thousand U.S. corporations,182 and the three largest
mutual fund families own 18.75% of total U.S. public equities and direct
the voting of a much larger percentage.183 The result has been to shift
governance concerns to those of agency capitalism: the devaluation of
governance rights that results from those rights being held by investment
intermediaries who rationally undervalue them. Activist shareholders
then function as a response to concentrated institutional ownership and
as a means to arbitrage the value of governance rights by creating the
opportunity for reticent institutional record shareholders to act in their
beneficiaries’ interest. Nothing requires that the SEC ignore dramatic
changes in the capital markets over the last forty-five years when
evaluating the current section 13(d) disclosure regime.
CONCLUSION
We have described an embedded monitoring shortfall in the
dominant form of share ownership in the United States and other jurisdictions as well. Intermediary institutional investors are highly effective
vehicles for financial intermediation and risk bearing. Their effectiveness
derives in part from the specialization that also gives rise to what we have
called the agency costs of agency capitalism. Rather than insist that
institutions remodel themselves in a fashion that is inconsistent with their
business model and therefore unlikely to succeed, we have suggested that
the downside of specialization may be best addressed by fostering the
development of a complementary set of specialists, in this case, activist
182. See supra Table I.
183. See supra notes 78 and accompanying text.
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shareholders, a species of hedge funds. On the governance dimension,
institutional investors are not so much rationally passive as rationally
reticent. The interaction between shareholder activists and institutional
investors—one proposing, the other disposing—gives value to the institutions’ low-powered governance capacities, in effect operating to arbitrage
the undervaluation of governance rights in the hands of reticent institutional investors. Governance markets thus become more complete. The
net result is better monitoring and, perhaps, lower agency costs in the
real economy.
To be sure, there is a risk that both institutional investors and activist
investors may be myopic, to the end of increasing the value of a specula184
tive option. But there is a corresponding risk that company managers
may be hyperopic, acting to increase the option value of their control by
extending its length, especially if, because of poor performance and
strategy, it is then out of the money. No governance structure will perfectly distinguish between those alternatives, in part because the conflicting views are not mutually exclusive and both sides may have come to
hold those views in good faith. In the end, we do best by allowing activist
shareholders to bet their assets on their ability to persuade sophisticated
institutional investors that they are right in their assessment of portfolio
company strategy.

184. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term
Investors 13–16 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstr
act=2188661 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (designing security that would make
investors more long-term-oriented).
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